Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards10/14/1999
minal trial context and, once again, declined to do so. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, , 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). The majority summarized the Court's historical approach to the applicability of the exclusionary rule as follows:
We have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046-3047, 3048-3049, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Rather, a Fourth Amendment violation is "`fully accomplished'" by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding can "`cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.'" United States v. Leon, supra, at 906, 104 S.Ct., at 3412 (quoting Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540, 96 S.Ct., at 3074 (White, J., Dissenting)). The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does not "proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons," Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486, 96 S.Ct., at 3049, but applies only in contexts "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) ("If ... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted"). Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S., at 907, 104 S.Ct., at 3412. Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials. Id., at 909, 104 S.Ct., at 3413; United States v. Janis, supra, at 447, 96 S.Ct., at 3028-3029.
Id. at , 118 S. Ct. at 2019. Prior to Scott, the proceedings outside a criminal trial to which the Supreme Court had refused to extend the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment included grand jury proceedings, see Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613; federal civil tax proceedings, see Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021; and civil deportation proceedings, see I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984). It thus remains true in the wake of Scott that " n the complex and turbulent history of the [exclusionary] rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." Janis, 428 U.S. at 447; 96 S. Ct. at 3029. In each case in which the Supreme Court has considered so extending this remedy, "the Court determined that the potential benefit of applying the exclusionary rule was outweighed by the resulting cost to societal interests." Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
This Court has also been called upon several times to determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to civil proceedings in various contexts. In only one case have we held the exclusionary rule applicable to a proceeding other than a criminal trial. See One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680 (1999) (following Supreme Court's holding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965) a
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|