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State v. Mahmud12/7/1999
done so. Section 513.430(10)(f), therefore, does not apply to the funds in Mr. Mahmud's prison account that were paid to him as a beneficiary of his mother's IRA.
Mr. Mahmud argues that it is the origin of the funds that make them exempt under section 513.430(10)(f). He cites two Western District cases, State ex rel. Nixon v. McClure, 969 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998), and Hatfield v. Cristopher, 841 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992), for the proposition that "once legally exempt funds are received they remain impressed with their exempt character." The anti-attachment provisions at issue in McClure and Hatfield, however, contained broader, more inclusive language than that in section 513.430(10)(f). In McClure, the federal exemption provision for civil service benefits, 5 U.S.C. section 8346(a)(1996), was analyzed. The statute provides, "the money mentioned in this subchapter is not...subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process." 5 U.S.C. section 8346(a)(1996)(emphasis added). At issue in Hatfield was the federal social security exemption, 42 U.S.C. section 407(a)(1991), which provides, "none of the moneys paid or payable...under [the Social Security Act] shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process." 42 U.S.C. section 407(a)(1991)(emphasis added). Unlike section 513.430(10)(f), the federal anti-attachment provisions at issue in McClure and Hatfield contain more extensive language that encompasses not only funds payable to a beneficiary but also funds that have been paid to and are in the possession and control of the intended beneficiary. Because section 513.430(10)(f) only protects from attachment and execution money payable to a beneficiary from an IRA , the funds in Mr. Mahmud's prison account that had been paid to him from his mother's IRA were not exempt under the statute. The State, therefore, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mahmud. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of the State of Missouri.
All concur.
Separate Opinion: None
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