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Rider v. Director of Revenue11/30/1999
for a hardship driving privilege under section 302.309.3(6)(a). However, Hagan had a felony conviction involving the use of a motor vehicle--a circumstance that did disqualify him for a hardship driving privilege by operation of section 302.309.3(5)(b). 968 S.W.2d at 706. Since Hagan could not satisfy the third requirement of section 302.309.3(6)(a), i.e., he could not show he was not "otherwise ineligible" under other provisions of section 302.309.3, he could not obtain a hardship driving privilege, and the trial court erred in granting him one. Id.
In Sanders v. Director of Revenue, 998 S.W.2d 804 (Mo.App. 1999), Director had issued a ten-year denial of Sanders's license effective August 11, 1992. Five years later, in August 1997, Sanders sought and received a judgment granting him a limited driving privilege. Director appealed, and the eastern district reversed. In so doing, the court observed that Sanders would have qualified for the limited driving privilege under section 302.309.3(6)(a) if not for the fact that his license had been revoked twice before for violating section 577.041 by refusing to submit to chemical tests. Id. at 806 . The eastern district held that those two violations rendered Sanders ineligible for a limited driving privilege under section 302.309.3(5)(f). Id. The court concluded:
" s [Sanders] had twice previously refused to take a chemical test in violation of RSMo Section 577.041, he was 'otherwise ineligible for a limited driving privilege' under RSMo section 302.309.3(6)(a). Accordingly, because [Sanders] was statutorily ineligible to receive hardship driving privileges, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to grant such privileges. Thus, as the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it may not have taken any other action other than to exercise its powers to dismiss this action. Therefore, the trial court's granting of hardship driving privileges, under the circumstances at bar, is null and void." Id. at 806.
Relying on Hagan, 968 S.W.2d 704, and Sanders, 998 S.W.2d 804, we find that Rider was ineligible for a limited driving privilege under section 302.309.3(6)(a) because of his multiple violations of section 577.041. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Rider a limited driving privilege and should have dismissed his petition. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is null and void.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Page 1 2 Missouri DUI Attorneys
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