Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs11/24/1999
THE DRIVER WAS OPERATING THE VEHICLE IN A RECKLESS MANNER.
. Floyd argues that the power of a law enforcement officer to perform an investigatory stop without a warrant is limited to those instances when a misdemeanor or felony is committed in the presence of the officer or when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is involved in a felony. Thus, Floyd contends that because reckless driving is a misdemeanor and because Officer Palmer did not personally observe Floyd driving in a reckless manner, the stop performed by Officer Palmer was unlawful as a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution contain almost identical language expressing a person's right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures "applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of a vehicle." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed. 2d 852 (1981). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed. 2d 676 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
. By statute in Mississippi, a law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, a suspect for a misdemeanor when the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(1) (Supp. 1999). However, the statute permits an officer to arrest a suspect for a felony where the officer has reasonable ground to believe the person to be arrested committed a felony, even though not committed in the officer's presence.
. The constitutional requirements for an investigative stop and detention are less stringent than those for an arrest. This Court has recognized that "given reasonable circumstances an officer may stop and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge to justify an arrest," that is, on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Singletary v. State, 318 So. 2d 873, 876 (Miss. 1975). See also McCray v. State, 486 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Miss. 1986). Such an investigative stop of a suspect may be made so long as an officer has "a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a felony...." McCray, 486 So. 2d at 1249 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed. 2d 604, 612 (1985)), or as long as the officers have "some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." McCray, 486 So. 2d at 1249-50 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695).
. The United States Supreme Court approved this investigatory procedure in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed. 2d 612 (1972). In determining whether there exists the requisite "reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts," the court must consider whether, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officers had a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 694-95 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed. 2d 357 (1979)).
. As this Court noted in Singletary, the United States Supreme Court has "unequivocably settled the question of the lawfulness of an investigative stop whe
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