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Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs11/24/1999
re there is no probable cause to arrest if the officer acts reasonably." Singletary, 318 So. 2d at 877. The test is thus one of reasonableness, and neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has articulated a concrete rule to determine what circumstances justify an investigatory stop. Green v. State, 348 So. 2d 428, 429 (Miss. 1977). The question is approached on a case-by-case basis. Id. The United States Supreme Court has stated that, as a general rule, "the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed. 2d 89 (1996) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1399, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332, 54 L.Ed. 2d 331 (1977)).
. Floyd argues that an investigative stop is lawful only where the officer has observed the suspect committing a misdemeanor or reasonably believes the person to have committed a felony. Floyd contends that because an officer could not lawfully arrest a suspect without a warrant where the misdemeanor was committed outside the officer's presence, the investigative stop of a misdemeanor suspect violates the Fourth Amendment where the misdemeanor occurred outside the officer's presence. The State distinguishes between the standard of reasonable suspicion required for an investigative stop and the misdemeanor / felony distinction made by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 in determining probable cause to arrest.
. For this argument, Floyd cites to the following language found in Floyd v. State, 500 So. 2d 989 (Miss. 1986):
An investigative stop may be made even where officials have no probable cause to make an arrest as long as they have "a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved or is wanted in connection with a completed felony . . . or 'some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.'"
Floyd, 500 So. 2d at 992 (quoting McCray v. State, 486 So. 2d at 1249-50). The defendant in Floyd was suspected of drug trafficking. The highway patrol put out a bulletin on the defendant's vehicle. The defendant was subsequently spotted by a trooper and pulled over. The trooper first arrested the defendant, then smelled marijuana when he leaned inside the car. The trooper then opened the trunk and discovered bales of marijuana. On appeal, this Court stated that the trooper lacked both the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity required to make the stop as well as the probable cause required to arrest the defendant. Floyd, 500 So. 2d at 993 n.1. The trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop because he was told only to be on the lookout for the defendant's vehicle and to advise headquarters if he stopped the vehicle. The trooper had no idea why the defendant was wanted. The trooper lacked probable cause to make the arrest because the arrest preceded the discovery of the marijuana, and the scant information given to the officer was not enough to amount to probable cause.
. The above quoted language which is urged by Floyd in this case was first utilized by this Court in McCray v. State, 486 So. 2d 1247 (Miss. 1986). Like Floyd, McCray involved a suspected felony, not a traffic violation. In McCray, officers observed certain characteristics of the often-used drug courier profile in determining that the defendant was likely involved in drug trafficking. Officers stopped the defendant in an airport terminal. A drug-detecting dog reacted positively to the suitcase belonging to the defendant. Th
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