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State v. Gaede12/7/1999
n the instant case in Collyer v. State of New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department, 121 N.M. 477, 913 P.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1995). Collyer was charged with a second-offense DWI. Collyer had been convicted of a DWI previously and was aware that a second-offense DWI would result in a mandatory driver's license revocation. Collyer entered into a negotiated plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead nolo contendere to the charge and pay all fines if the conviction was adjudicated as a first-offense DWI, so that his driver's license would not be revoked. The sentencing court accepted the plea and "in its judgment and sentence expressly provided that `the conviction is . . . a "first conviction" within the meaning of Section 66-8-102 . . . and shall be treated as such for all lawful purposes.'" Id. at 478, 913 P.2d at 666 (emphasis added). The Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) subsequently revoked Collyer's driver's license. Collyer appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari directing the MVD to treat his DWI conviction as a first offense, as opposed to a subsequent offense. The Collyer Court held that because the sentencing court's judgment explicitly "provided that the conviction could only be used as a `first conviction' for all lawful purposes," the MVD was bound by the judgment, as the final authority of the State. Id. The Court recognized that the district attorney, magistrate court, and Collyer entered a judgment that "was intended to have the specific effect of preserving Collyer's driver's license." Id. The Court explained that the MVD's power to revoke a driver's license depended upon the court's judgment rendering Collyer a subsequent offender. See id. at 479, 913 P.2d at 667. In addition, the Court held that the district attorney had the authority to bind all state agencies foreseeably related to the plea bargain. See id. at 479-80, 913 P.2d at 667-68.
{18} The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Collyer. First, the plea bargain at issue in Collyer was significantly different than the plea agreements in this case. Specifically, the parties to the Collyer plea bargain provided that Collyer would be treated as a first-time DWI offender so that his driver's license would not be revoked. The plea bargain explicitly so provided. In contrast, the trial court could find that the parties in this case never agreed in 1994 and 1995 that Defendant's 1984 conviction would not be used to enhance subsequent DWI convictions in the event of subsequent violations of the DWI statute. The fact that Defendant received more lenient treatment in his prior DWI sentences than was authorized by statute does not bind the State to similar lenient treatment in subsequent cases.
{19} In sum, we conclude that the district court neither abused its discretion nor denied Defendant his constitutional rights to due process in concluding that Defendant had three prior convictions which could be used to aggravate Defendant's current DWI sentence.
CONCLUSION
{20} The judgment and sentence are affirmed.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.
THOMAS A. DONNELLY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
LYNN PICKARD, Chief Judge
RUDY S. APODACA, Judge
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