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State v. Morrissette11/15/1999
esented when their guilty pleas were offered. In its ruling, the court first noted that neither the federal nor state constitutions require suppression of procedurally defective prior convictions where the defendants were represented by counsel. It held that due process does not include the right to collaterally attack a conviction when the defendant failed to raise any constitutional or V.R.Cr.P. 11 violation on appeal or in a request for plea withdrawal or post-conviction relief. Defendant appeals from this decision. Because we conclude that defendant's 1992 conviction was the result of a valid guilty plea, we do not address the issue addressed by the trial court.
The purpose of V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)-(d) is to assure that a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made. See In re Thompson, 166 Vt. 471, 474, 697 A.2d 1111, 1113 (1997). Toward this end, we have required a practical application of the rule ensuring fairness, rather than a technical formula to be followed. See State v. Ploof, 162 Vt. 560, 563, 649 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994). The precise form of the V.R.Cr.P. 11 colloquy may vary from case to case, depending on factors such as the competence of the defendant and the complexity of the legal issues. See In re Hall 143 Vt. 590, 595, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983). In such inquiries, " atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling." Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16, 17 (6th Cir. 1968). When a collateral attack is brought against the validity of a plea based on alleged violations of V.R.Cr.P. 11, we require substantial compliance with the requirements the rule. See Thompson, 166 Vt. at 476, 697 A.2d at 1113-14.
The reality in this instance is that defendant was represented by counsel when he executed a waiver-of-rights form and a notice-of-plea agreement and pleaded guilty to the 1992 charge of DUI. Responding to the court's inquiry, he asserted that he understood the waiver form and the plea agreement. Given the straightforward nature of the charge and the lack of any evidence that defendant was not competent to understand his situation, we conclude that (1) defendant's execution of the waiver forms and written plea agreement, (2) the court's inquiry confirming that defendant understood these documents, and (3) defendant's stipulation to the factual basis for the charge show substantial compliance with V.R.Cr.P. 11. Accordingly, the court did not err in ruling that defendant's 1992 DUI conviction could be used to enhance the penalty for his most recent DUI conviction.
Because we hold that defendant's 1992 counseled guilty plea was valid, we do not reach the forum and burden of proof issues he raised.
Affirmed.
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice, John A. Dooley, Associate Justice, James L. Morse, Associate Justice, Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice, Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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