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Prindle v. State9/28/1999
JO-063C
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found William Prindle guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and speeding. Prindle appeals, arguing that the prosecutions were time-barred, the officer who administered the breath test did not have a valid permit to conduct the test, and the trial court admitted evidence which should have been excluded due to the state's failure to comply with discovery rules. Because each contention is without merit, we affirm.
1. Prindle contends that his convictions must be reversed because the accusations were filed more than two years after he allegedly committed the offenses. This enumeration is without merit.
Prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years after the offense was committed. OCGA § 17-3-1 (d). The two-year period runs from the date the offense was committed until the date the original accusation is filed. Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 905, 907- 908 (8) (392 SE2d 330) (1990); OCGA § 16-1-3 (14). A prosecution continues until there has been a final Disposition of the case. OCGA § 16-1-3 (14). A uniform traffic citation serves as an accusation in any court having jurisdiction over the offense, except superior court. See OCGA § 40-13-1; OCGA § 40-13-3; State v. Rustin, 208 Ga. App. 431, 433 (2) (430 SE2d 765) (1993). Prior to trial, the state can amend the accusation to change the allegations regarding any offense arising out of the same conduct which gave rise to an offense alleged or attempted to be alleged in the original accusation. OCGA § 17-7-71 (f); see Thomas v. State, 233 Ga. App. 224, 225 (1) (504 SE2d 59) (1998).
On February 16, 1995, police issued Prindle uniform traffic citations charging him with driving while under the influence of alcohol (with an unlawful blood-alcohol concentration) and speeding. The citation for DUI showed the date of the offense, the code section allegedly violated (former OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (4)), and Prindle's breath test result of 0.132. The citation for speeding showed the date of the offense, that Prindle was allegedly driving 70 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone, and the code section he allegedly violated (OCGA § 40-6- 181). The citations were filed in Atlanta City Court on February 20, 1995. On March 17, 1995, Prindle waived formal arraignment and demanded a jury trial.
On February 18, 1997, the state filed accusations in city court charging Prindle with driving under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 grams or more (citing former OCGA § 40-6- 391 (a) (4)), and speeding by driving 70 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone (citing OCGA § 40-6-181). The accusations gave the same date of the offenses as was shown on the citations.
The amended accusations filed in 1997 did not constitute the commencement of a new prosecution. There had been no final Disposition of the previously filed accusations. The amended accusations were a continuation of the prosecution commenced earlier. See Rustin, supra. We find that, contrary to Prindle's argument, the state has shown that the amended accusations were based on the same conduct as the original citations. The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the charges on the ground that the statute of limitation expired. See generally Freeman, supra at 908 (8).
2. Prindle's argument that the breath test results should not have been admitted because the officer conducting the test was not properly certified is without merit.
OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1) (A) provides, in relevant part, that the chemical analysis of a person's breath is valid if performed by a person possessing a valid permit issued by the Division of Forensic Services ("DFS") of the G
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