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Puckett v. State8/11/1999
Steven Glenn Puckett appeals a Fayette County State Court's denial of his plea in bar. In addition, he challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the results of his breath test. We affirm the trial court's rulings.
1. Following his arrest, Puckett faced two State law offenses:
"OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), DUI - less safe driver; and OCGA §§ 40-6-48, 40-6-1, failure to maintain a lane. In addition, Puckett was charged with a violation of section 14-2 of the Peachtree City Code of Ordinances, Resisting/Interfering with Arrest. In the Peachtree City Municipal Court, Puckett filed a motion requesting to have all three charges bound over to the State Court of Fayette County for a jury trial. The municipal court bound over the two State charges, but kept jurisdiction over the municipal offense. Puckett was found guilty on the municipal offense."
Thereafter, based on double jeopardy grounds, Puckett filed in the Fayette County State Court a plea in bar as to the State law offenses, contending that, pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), the State was required to prosecute Puckett for all crimes arising from the same conduct, and thus, the State's failure to prosecute the DUI and failure to maintain a lane offenses in conjunction with the ordinance violation resulted in a statutory bar as to the untried State law offenses. The trial court disagreed and denied the plea in bar. We concur in that judgment.
OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) provides that " f the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution[.]" (Emphasis supplied.)
Puckett is correct that, initially, the Peachtree City Municipal Court had jurisdiction over all three offenses. However, when Puckett filed his motion requesting a jury trial, the municipal court was divested of jurisdiction over the State law offenses of DUI and failure to maintain a lane. OCGA § 40-13-23 (a). See also OCGA § 15-9-30.6 (c). The municipal court retained jurisdiction over the ordinance violation. Kolker v. State, 260 Ga. 240 (391 SE2d 391) (1990).
Accordingly, there was no error in disposing of the ordinance violation in municipal court, while binding over the State law offenses for a jury trial in State court, as per Puckett's request. "OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) does not preclude successive state and municipal prosecutions, only successive prosecutions for state crimes." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dickinson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 467, 468 (382 SE2d 187) (1989). See also Fuller v. State, 169 Ga. App. 468, 469 (313 SE2d 745) (1984). Notably, " ne cannot complain of a judgment, ruling or result he has procured or aided in causing by his own strategy, tactics or conduct. [Cits.]" Turney v. State, 235 Ga. App. 431, 433-434 ( SE2d ) (1998).
2. Puckett claims error in the trial court's denial of his oral motion in limine to suppress the result of his blood alcohol test. This enumeration is bottomed on the following set of facts, construed "most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment":
"At just after midnight on March 28, 1996, Captain S. Pye of the Peachtree City Police Department concluded his tour of duty on the evening shift. It had been raining very heavily that evening; " he rain had literally been a downpour, just a torrential downpour, up until ll:30 [p.m.]." A deputy was driving Pye home when the officers spotted "on Peachtree Parkway south, right there at Center Green, there was a large area of grass and mud that had been disturbed obviously by a vehicle. . . . The medi
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