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Hooker v. State9/23/1999
eme Court of Georgia, determined that the acceptance of a defendant's misdemeanor plea constitutes a bar to his prosecution on felony charges arising from the same transaction where an assistant district attorney having jurisdiction over all the offenses, had made an election, whether intentionally or by default, to dispose of the charges separately rather than requiring all the offenses to be bound over to superior court. This was in consonance with McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515 (315 SE2d 413), in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held that "a successive prosecution is barred when the conduct of an accused establishes more than one crime and they are not prosecuted in accordance with OCGA § 16-1-7 (b)." State v. McCrary, 253 Ga. 747, supra at 748.
If the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section. OCGA § 16-1-7 (b).
In the instant circumstances, it is undisputed that defendant's crimes arose from the same conduct and that all were known to the district attorney. While it thus was within the district attorney's power to seek a single prosecution of the charges, such a prosecution was not brought in the case sub judice because of default in the State -- that is, the apparently well-intended but misguided acts of commission and omission by Sheriff Stephens and the secretary who assisted him in the district attorney's office. Moreover, in reaching the foregoing Conclusion, we are not unmindful of Powe v. State, 181 Ga. App. 429, 431 (352 SE2d 783), in which this Court held it is not reasonable to impute the knowledge of one prosecutor to other prosecutors "where two entirely separate prosecuting offices are involved and where defense counsel has deliberately set out to exploit the situation." (Emphasis added.) Unlike Powe, however, in this case defendant's guilty pleas were accepted, and, inasmuch as defendant was unrepresented in State Court, there was no attempt by any trial counsel to manipulate the system. See State v. McCrary, 253 Ga. 747, supra (" ne who misuses the system, through no fault of the state, should not be able to successfully raise a plea in bar which arises because of his manipulation. . . ."). See also Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758 (1) (341 SE2d 288).
Therefore, we conclude that the prosecution in the State Court against the defendant now prevents a successive prosecution in the Superior Court of the misdemeanor and felony charges against him. The order of the Superior Court denying the plea in bar is reversed, and the case is remanded for action, as appropriate, consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. Johnson, C. J., and Phipps, J., concur.
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