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Parks v. State7/27/1999
Ru-058C
Gary Parks, who was charged with three traffic violations, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal on speedy trial grounds. Finding no error, we affirm.
On October 17, 1997, Parks was arrested and issued three uniform traffic citations for failure to maintain lane, DUI, and no proof of insurance. On October 20, 1997, the citations were received and stamped as "filed" in the Cobb County State Court clerk's office. The solicitor never filed a formal accusation against Parks. On February 10, 1998, Parks waived formal arraignment and filed a demand for a jury trial in that term or the next term. Parks, however, was not tried within that term or the following term. On May 20, 1998, Parks filed a motion for discharge and acquittal pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170. The trial court denied Parks' motion on grounds that his speedy trial demand was not timely because it was not filed within the same or following term as the uniform traffic citations were filed.
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170,
" ny person against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not affecting his life may enter a demand for trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter; or by special permission of the court, he may at any subsequent court term thereafter demand a trial. . . . If the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation."
OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) & (b); see also State v. Gerbert, 267 Ga. 169, 170 (475 SE2d 621) (1996)."It is well settled in Georgia law that the protection conferred by OCGA § 17-7-170 attaches with the formal indictment or accusation." (Punctuation omitted.) Tyler v. State, 224 Ga. App. 550, 551 (481 SE2d 228) (1997). At that point, the clock starts running on the time for the accused to make a speedy trial demand. OCGA § 17-7-170 (a); Jackson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 187, 187-188 (1) (498 SE2d 780) (1998). In the case of an alleged traffic violation, a uniform traffic citation functions as an accusation, without the necessity of filing an additional, formal accusation. OCGA § 40-13-1; Hayek v. State, 269 Ga. 728, 729 (2) (506 SE2d 372) (1998); Smith v. State, 207 Ga. App. 762 (429 SE2d 149) (1993). The Supreme Court has established a bright-line rule that the right to a speedy trial in such a case attaches when the state files a uniform traffic citation with the court. Gerbert, supra.
The citations issued to Parks were filed in the clerk's office on October 20, 1997, during the September 1997 term of court. Because the filing of the citations functioned as an accusation, Parks' speedy trial clock started running in the September 1997 term of court. Parks did not file his speedy trial demand, however, until two terms later, in the January 1998 term. There is no indication in the record that Parks sought special permission from the court to file his demand out of time. Accordingly, Parks' demand was untimely under OCGA § 17-7-170 (a), and the trial court properly denied his motion for discharge and acquittal. See State v. Black, 213 Ga. App. 331 (444 SE2d 368) (1994) (trial demand that was not filed during term of court in which uniform traffic citations were filed or in next regular term was untimely); Ingram v. State, 224 Ga. App. 271, 272 (3) (480 SE2d 302) (1997) (speedy trial demand should be rejected when not filed within statutory period).
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