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State v. Porter7/29/1999
ng on the kidnapping and sexual assault charges. Indeed, he did not even claim a strong need to remain silent on those charges. We decline to consider the defendant's briefed argument relating to this prong because it was first articulated on appeal. See id. Accordingly, the defendant has not shown an abuse of discretion.
The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to inquire into underlying facts of prior criminal convictions that had been admitted for impeachment purposes. The court permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior convictions in Massachusetts for larceny, breaking and entering, and unauthorized use of an automobile. As to the larceny conviction, the State elicited testimony from the defendant that he had stolen stereo equipment and a video tape recorder with a value of more than $250 from Sharon Fineberg. The State also adduced evidence that one of the breaking and entering convictions involved the defendant's breaking and entering a building, ship, or vessel of Sharon Fineberg with the intent to commit a felony. Finally, with respect to the conviction for unauthorized use of an automobile, the State elicited testimony confirming that the conviction involved the property of Alan Locke.
Although a defendant's prior convictions may be admissible under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609, we have stated that "care must be taken by the Trial Court that the cross-examination relating to prior convictions is not conducted in such a manner as to cause undue prejudice to the defendant." State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 297, 235 A.2d 111, 116 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968). The defendant argues that only the bare facts of the conviction and Disposition are admissible under Rule 609. See 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 609.05 (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed., 1999). We need not address this argument, however, because the additional information that was admitted relating to the defendant's prior convictions was innocuous. Cf. State v. Donohue, 126 N.H. 182, 183, 489 A.2d 139, 140 (1985). Furthermore, the trial court twice gave an appropriate limiting instruction concerning the evidence. Lastly, the defendant has not demonstrated how the facts elicited at trial prejudiced his case.
Finally, we turn to the defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in sentencing him to extended terms under RSA 651:6, (I)(c) when it based the enhancement upon previously served concurrent sentences. The State agrees with this position and concedes that the defendant's sentences should be vacated. In light of this concession, on the record before us in this case, we need not reach the merits of the defendant's argument. We vacate the defendant's sentences and remand for resentencing.
We decline to address the defendant's remaining arguments because they are either meritless, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322, 627 A.2d 595, 596 (1993), or were not properly preserved for appellate review, see State v. Colbert, 139 N.H. 367, 370, 654 A.2d 963, 965-66 (1995) (issues raised in notice of appeal but not briefed are waived); State v. Ryan, 135 N.H. 587, 588, 607 A.2d 954, 955 (1992) (preservation of issue for appeal requires contemporaneous and specific objection).
Convictions affirmed; sentences vacated; remanded for resentencing.
All concurred.
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