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People v. Menendez2/7/2003
Allen Jeffrey Menendez was convicted of unlawful vehicle taking (Veh. Code, § 10851) and a prior conviction was found true. The trial court doubled Menendez's sentence because the prior qualified as a "strike" under the Three Strikes law. Menendez contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike the prior. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I.
Defendant stole a truck when the driver, Ruben Jiminez, left the vehicle idling while turning in his timesheet for work. Jiminez and a friend pursued the thief in another car. The chase ended after defendant collided with his pursuers and fled on foot. He was apprehended by the police shortly thereafter.
Defendant's criminal record includes convictions for driving under the influence , vehicle theft, battery, and a state prison commitment for carjacking and evading arrest. He also had a history of parole violations, and was on parole at the time he committed the current offense.
The trial court declined to strike the prior because the crime was "more aggravated than a typical car theft . . . ." The court noted defendant's parole status and "the number of crimes that he had engaged in a relatively short period of time in his life. [ ] his is not a situation where he had an old strike and then a substantial period of clean living and then falling off the wagon, so to speak."
II.
Menendez contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike his prior and impose a lesser sentence. He views the current offense as a minor, nonviolent crime and the 1995 prior as remote. He emphasizes his remorse and willingness to undergo treatment for his alcoholism, and notes his skill as a plumber would allow him to support his family. Menendez relied on these same factors in the trial court.
In People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, the Supreme Court addressed the exercise of discretion in a Three Strikes case. Trial courts "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part . . . ." (Id. at p. 161.) Here, the record reveals the trial court followed these guidelines and considered the relevant criteria at sentencing, including the mitigating factors defendant emphasizes on appeal. The trial court found the circumstances of the crime, defendant's criminal record, and his parole status outweighed any mitigation. This conclusion is not unreasonable. As for defendant's mitigation, we note his 1995 prior conviction is not remote when defendant's five-year prison sentence is factored into the equation. His numerous parole violations demonstrate incorrigibility, and his failure to pay child support belie his claim of fatherly concern for his child.
The standard of review is deferential, not de novo. The court's observation in People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, is apt: "It is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of [defendant's] prior convictions. Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance." (Id. at p. 310.) So it is here. Given this record, we discern no abuse of discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
IKOLA, J.
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