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State v. Davis7/28/1999
terpretation.
[ ] Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See City of Sioux Falls v. Ewoldt, 1997 SD 106, § 12, 568 NW2d 764, 766. In interpreting SDCL 32-23-4.6, the trial court correctly observed that, " hen the language of a statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and this court's only function is to declare the meaning as clearly expressed in the statute." State v. Schnaidt, 410 NW2d 539, 541 (SD 1987). However, the trial court erred in stopping there. While it is true that courts should not enlarge a statute beyond its declaration if its terms are clear and unambiguous[,] ... in cases where a literal approach would functionally annul the law, the cardinal purpose of statutory construction -- ascertaining legislative intent - ought not be limited to simply reading a statute's bare language; [courts] must also reflect upon the purpose of the enactment, the matter sought to be corrected and the goal to be attained.
De Smet Ins. of South Dakota v. Gibson, 1996 SD 102, § 7, 552 NW2d 98, 100 (citations omitted). Or, as this Court has also stated:
"' mbiguity is a condition of construction, and may exist where the literal meaning of a statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable Conclusion.'" Furthermore, " tatutes should be given a sensible, practical and workable construction, and to such end, the manifest intent of legislature will prevail over literal meaning of words." Valandra v. Dept. of Commerce & Reg., 425 NW2d 400, 402 (SD 1988) (citations omitted).
[ ] Here, the trial court's literal interpretation of SDCL 32-23-4.6 leads to an absurd and unreasonable Conclusion. Under that interpretation, a DUI defendant with a prior felony third offense under the laws of this state is subject to a Class 5 felony for a later offense while a defendant with a prior felony third offense under the laws of another state is only subject to a Class 6 felony for a later offense. There is no rational explanation for this disparate treatment. Moreover, it flies in the face of SDCL 32-23-4.5 which permits DUI convictions from other states to be used in repeat DUI offender prosecutions. The Legislature's intention with this statute was to treat prior DUI offenses from other states the same as those from this state for purposes of repeat offender prosecutions. The trial court's narrow interpretation of SDCL 32-23-4.6 violates that intention.
[ ] The legislative history of SDCL 32-23-4.6 also offers no support for the trial court's interpretation. Prior to 1989, SDCL 32-23-4 made a third, fourth or subsequent DUI offense a Class 6 felony regardless of the state in which the prior convictions were obtained. However, in cases where a DUI defendant had a prior felony DUI conviction, some prosecutors would seek a double enhancement of the punishment to a Class 5 felony by charging violations of both SDCL 32-23-4 and SDCL 22-7-7, the general felony repeat offender provision. See e.g. Carroll v. Solem, 424 NW2d 155 (SD 1988). This Court ended the double enhancement practice under SDCL 22-7-7 with its decision in Carroll in June, 1988. Thus, during the 1989 legislative session, the Legislature enacted SDCL 32-23-4.6 which permits the direct enhancement of punishment for a fourth or subsequent DUI offense to a Class 5 felony without reliance on SDCL 22-7-7. See 1989 SD SessL ch 273, § 2. Obviously, the Legislature's purpose in enacting SDCL 32-23-4.6 was to respond to Carroll and to increase the available punishment for fourth or subsequent DUI offenses, not to limit the availability of prior out of state DUI felonies for purposes of sentence enhancement.
[ ] Based upon the foregoing, t
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