State v. Durham7/26/1999
and his anxiety and dependent personality disorders precluded any premeditation or deliberation. First, under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-11-503(a) (1997), intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence if it is relevant to negate a culpable mental state. However, whether a defendant is too far intoxicated to premeditate and deliberate prior to a killing is a question for the jury to determine. See, e.g., State v. Arnold, No. 81, 1988 WL 87671, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, August 25, 1988)(upholding the appellant's convictions for premeditated first degree murder when the evidence demonstrated that, soon after the killings, the appellant's blood alcohol level was 0.16 and he had a Diazepam level of 0.1). In this case, the jury was entirely justified in concluding that, despite his intoxication, the appellant was capable of forming the requisite culpable mental state.
Second, under Tennessee law, evidence of a mental disease or defect that does not rise to the level of an insanity defense is nevertheless admissible to negate elements of specific intent, including premeditation and deliberation in a first degree murder case. State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). See also State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 688-690 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 2348 (1998); State v. Abrams, 935 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tenn. 1996). Again, however, this court may not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d at 561. Accordingly, we must defer to a jury's determination that the appellant was capable of forming the requisite intent if supported by evidence adduced at trial. State v. Perry, No. 01C01-9710-CC-00467, 1999 WL 233522, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, April 22, 1999).
The State offered no medical testimony to refute Dr. Wishart's contention that the appellant was incapable of premeditating and deliberating his wife's murder. However, in the context of the defense of insanity and the State's burden to prove a defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, our supreme court has observed that a jury is not required to accept the testimony of a psychiatrist to the exclusion of lay testimony or to the exclusion of evidence of actions of a defendant inconsistent with the expert's testimony. Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tenn. 1976). Similarly, in the context of an allegation of "diminished capacity" and the State's burden to prove premeditation and deliberation, the jury was not required to accept the testimony of Dr. Wishart to the exclusion of all other evidence. In fact, the record overwhelmingly contradicts Dr. Wishart's Conclusion that the appellant was so "overwhelmed with emotions" or "out of control of his thinking" as to preclude premeditation and deliberation. This issue is without merit.
b. Prior Threatening Statement by the Appellant Toward the Victim
The appellant next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Ms. Coffey's testimony that the appellant had threatened Joyce Durham several weeks prior to the murder. Citing Tenn. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the appellant argues that the testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and that its admission thereby violated the appellant's right to due process of law under the Tennessee and federal constitutions. The State argues in turn that Ms. Coffey's testimony was relevant to the appellant's motive and intent, and that any danger of unfair prejudice to the appellant was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b).
As noted earlier, Ms. Coffee testified that, several weeks prior to Mrs. Durham's murder, the appellant called his wife at work and stated that, if she did not return home, she knew what
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Tennessee DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|