State v. Durham7/26/1999
would happen to her. The trial court admitted the testimony following a jury-out hearing. The court agreed with the State that Ms. Coffey's testimony was relevant to the appellant's motive and intent and that there was no danger of unfair prejudice to the appellant.
In determining the admissibility of evidence, a trial court must make a threshold determination of relevance. Tenn. R. Evid. 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." This court has further explained,
"`Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.'" State v. Davis, No. 03C01-9511-CC-00360, 1997 WL 184771, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)(citation omitted).
Relevant evidence is generally admissible, Tenn. R. Evid. 402, but even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Tenn. R. Evid. 403.
Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) specifically provides that evidence of prior bad acts by a defendant is not relevant to prove the character of the defendant and to show action in conformity with a character trait. However, such evidence is relevant to issues including a defendant's motive and intent. State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 707 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 2348 (1998). As under Tenn. R. Evid. 403, the trial court must determine under Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(3) whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We note, however, that the test in Rule 404(b) for balancing probative value against prejudicial effect is more stringent that the test set forth in Rule 403. See State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tenn. 1997).
The admissibility of a defendant's prior threats to a victim in a murder prosecution is subject to Rule 404(b). See, e.g., State v. Nichols, No. 01C01-9704-CR-00158, 1998 WL 468638, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, August 12, 1998), perm. to appeal granted, (Tenn. 1999); State v. Gunter, No. 03C01-9605-CC-00183, 1997 WL 798779, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, December 17, 1997), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1998); State v. Collier, No. 03C01-9602-CR-00072, 1997 WL 9722, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 14, 1997). A trial court's determination pursuant to Rule 404(b) will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102. We see no reason in this case to disturb the trial court's ruling.
It has long been accepted in Tennessee that prior threats by a defendant to a victim in a murder prosecution may be relevant to prove a defendant's motive or intent in a murder prosecution and, therefore, admissible in evidence. State v. Hunter, No. 01C01-9506-CR-00176, 1996 WL 473999, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, August 22, 1996). See also State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 575 (Tenn. 1993); Nichols, No. 01C01-9704-CR-00158, 1998 WL 468638, at *12; Collier, No. 03C01-9602-CR-00072, 1997 WL 9722, at *8. The appellant argues that the statement at issue in this case was so vague that it reveals nothing about the appellant's intent. Essentially, the appellant argues that his statement to the victim, that she knew what would happen if she failed to return home, was susceptible to any number of interpretations. According to the appellant, any probative value of the statement was therefore outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
We find our decision in
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