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State v. McKinney7/23/1999
On January 18, 1998, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellee Donald McKinney for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, sixth offense. On July 7, 1998, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court granted the motion on July 16, 1998. The State challenges the trial court's dismissal of the indictment, raising the following issue: whether the trial court erred when it determined that the indictment should be dismissed because Appellee's right to a speedy trial had been violated. After a review of the record, we find that neither Appellee's rights to a speedy trial nor his rights to due process of law were violated by the delay in bringing him to trial. The judgment of the trial court must therefore be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
FACTS
The alleged offense in this case occurred on March 29, 1995. Arrest warrants were issued on May 2, 1995, but for some reason the warrants remained unserved until January 1, 1998.
At the hearing on this issue, Appellee argued that the indictment should be dismissed because the delay between the alleged offense and the serving of the warrants had violated his right to a speedy trial. Appellee contended that he was prejudiced by the delay because he was prevented from obtaining the blood sample taken at the time of the alleged offense so that independent tests could be conducted.
The trial court dismissed the indictment after finding that the delay between the alleged offense and the serving of the warrants had violated Appellee's right to a speedy trial. However, the trial court made no finding as to whether Appellee had been prejudiced by the delay.
ANALYSIS
The State contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed the indictment merely because of the delay between the date of the alleged offense and the date on which the warrants were served. We must agree.
A. Right to a Speedy Trial
The United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee the criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tenn. 1997). The right to a speedy trial is also statutory in Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-101 (1997). In addition, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for the dismissal of an indictment, presentment, information or criminal complaint " f there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury against a defendant who has been held to answer to the trial court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial . . . ." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 48(b).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that "a warrant alone does not trigger speedy trial analysis; to the contrary, a formal grand jury action or the actual restraints of an arrest are required." Utley, 956 S.W.2d at 493. This is because "it is at this stage of arrest and grand jury action that the significant interests served by the right to a speedy trial are most directly implicated: the protection against oppressive pre-trial incarceration and the reduction of anxiety and concern caused by unresolved charges." Id.
Under Utley, it is clear that Appellee's right to a speedy trial was not implicated when the alleged offense occurred on March 29, 1995, or when the warrants were issued on May 2, 1995. Rather, Appellee's right to a speedy trial was not implicated until the warrants were served on January 1, 1998. Appellee asserted that his right to a speedy trial was violated on July 7, 1998, and the trial court dismissed the indictment on July 16, 1998, approximately six and one half months after the warrants were served.
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