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Lugo v. State2/20/2003
nt in a trial is entitled to engage in vigorous cross-examination of the witnesses presented against him. See, e.g., Oakes v. State, 746 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (stating that "a defendant in a criminal case has the constitutional right to fully cross-examine a prosecution witness concerning events about which the witness testified during direct examination"). Moreover, in many of the instances which Lugo cites as being improper adverse cross-examination by co-defendant Doorbal, Lugo failed to object to preserve the issue for review. This leaves fundamental error as the only basis for relief and we decline to apply such doctrine to grant relief on this issue.
Moreover, in McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1982), we concluded that in a trial in which appellant McCray asserted that his right to a fair trial was violated "because the defenses of co-defendants . . . were completely antagonistic to his defense," id. at 806, the joint trial of McCray and his co-defendants "did not in any way prejudice the right of [McCray] to a fair determination of his guilt or innocence of the offense [of first-degree murder]." Id. at 807. We noted in McCray that the appellant had a full opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses brought against him, and that the evidence was not so complex that the jury could not understand the case, apply the evidence, and make individualized determinations of guilt regarding each defendant. See id. at 806-07. These same circumstances hold true in Lugo's case and lead us to the conclusion that Lugo was not deprived of his right "to a fair determination of his guilt or innocence of the offense charged." Id. at 807. We therefore deny relief on this issue.
Evidence of Lugo's Federal Fraud Conviction and Probation
Lugo claims that the State impermissibly introduced evidence pertaining both to his prior federal conviction for fraud and his federal probation to establish his propensity to commit crimes or bad acts. The State asserts that introduction of the evidence was proper to show the involvement of both Lugo and co-defendant Mese in a scheme to launder money, gained from the extortion of Marc Schiller, that Lugo ultimately used to pay restitution for his federal fraud conviction and thereby end his probation early. With some qualification, we agree with the State.
The State presented various witnesses, including Lugo's federal probation officer, who testified as to their knowledge of various aspects of Lugo's previous federal fraud conviction or the probation he was serving for that conviction. Most of the testimony from these witnesses was properly linked to other evidence presented by the State that Lugo and co-defendant Mese had laundered proceeds garnered from the abduction of Schiller through various accounts controlled by Mese, with the goal of allowing Lugo to pay approximately $70,000 in restitution to end his federal probation early. In short, the State showed a motive for Lugo and Doorbal to launder money.
In Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1988), we addressed the admissibility of evidence related to a collateral crime:
he test of the admissibility of such evidence one of relevancy. Even if the evidence in question tends to reveal the commission of a collateral crime, it is admissible if found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity [to commit crimes or other bad acts]. Id. at 746-47 (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 1984)).
Our review of the record convinces us that the State's evidence regarding Lugo's federal conviction and probation was highly relevant to proving allegations of money laundering. Much of the State'
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