 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Coburn2/11/1999
the breathylizer served. He told her that the breathylizer served a twofold purpose. One, a test result over the legal limit would confirm or validate the officer's testimony regarding his observations of impairment. Two, the defendant had the opportunity to show that she was innocent by providing a breath sample below the legal limit;
and,
" jurors were given information from another juror regarding the "wide turn" from Congress Street onto Stevens Avenue. Specifically, a female juror who was unfamiliar with the intersection in question went out of her way to make that turn and reported to the other jurors that she did not have to turn wide."
After a hearing on the matter, the Superior Court denied Coburn's motion for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. Coburn then filed this appeal.
II. Discussion
To have found Coburn guilty of OUI, the jury must have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Coburn "operate a motor vehicle . . . hile under the influence of intoxicants[,] or . . . hile having a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more." 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1). It was undisputed that Coburn had operated a motor vehicle; therefore, the only question before the jury was whether she did so while under the influence of intoxicants. The state and federal constitutions guarantee that the accused shall have a right to a fair and impartial jury trial. See Me. Const. art. I, § 6; U.S. Const. amend. VI. Coburn contends that she was denied this right when the jury received extraneous information concerning both the purpose of an intoxilyzer test and Coburn's alleged "wide turn" from Congress Street onto Stevens Avenue.
When a defendant demonstrates that a juror was subjected to extraneous information and that the information is sufficiently related to the issues presented at trial, a presumption of prejudice is established, and the burden of proof shifts to the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the information did not cause prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Royal, 590 A.2d 523, 525 (Me. 1990) (citing State v. Kelley, 357 A.2d 890, 898-99 (Me. 1976)). The trial court begins its analysis by determining the nature, extent, timing and source of the information received by the jurors. It may not, however, inquire into the substance of the jury's deliberations. See Taylor v. Lapomarda, 1997 ME 216, § 6, 702 A.2d 685; State v. Kelley, 357 A.2d 890, 898-99 (Me. 1976); Patterson v. Rossignol, 245 A.2d 852, 856-57 (Me. 1968).
Once the trial court is convinced that a juror received extraneous information that was meaningfully related to the issues presented at trial, the jury verdict must be vacated unless the State demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the extraneous information did not prejudice the defendant. See Royal, 590 A.2d at 525. We review the trial court's finding regarding the prejudicial effect of extraneous evidence "only for clear error and will overturn the court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if there is no competent evidence to support it." Id.
A. Presumption of Prejudice
Because of the "long-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry," the trial court must assure that the process used to ascertain the facts relative to the juror's receipt of extraneous information does not encroach on the contents of the deliberations. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987). See M.R. Crim. P. 606(a). The trial court did so here by accepting the stipulations of the parties in lieu of testimony from the jurors. When the parties are able to agree on the source and
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Maine DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|