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State v. Coburn2/11/1999
the specifics of the extraneous facts acquired by a juror during trial, there is no need for testimony from that juror. This mechanism, similar to in camera inquiry by the court, avoids the prospect of unacceptable intrusions into the deliberations of the jury.
Once the trial court received the stipulations, its next task was to determine whether the information was, in fact, sufficiently relevant to the issues presented at trial to raise the presumption of prejudice. See State v. Kaler, 1997 ME 62, §§ 12-13, 691 A.2d 1226. Here, the court concluded that the information regarding the layout of the intersection did raise the presumption. It also determined that, while the information regarding the purpose of a breath test was only marginally relevant, it would assume that the presumption of prejudice had been raised. Because the jury in an OUI trial is entitled to consider the failure of a defendant to submit to a chemical test, information regarding the "purpose" of a test is directly relevant to the issues before the jury. To avoid misunderstandings or possible jury confusion, any such information should be presented to the jury, if at all, in the controlled confines of the trial. We find no error in the court's determination that the presumption of prejudice had been raised. See Royal, 590 A.2d at 525.
The burden then shifted to the State to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the extraneous information did not prejudice the jury's verdict. See id. Because the trial court is in the best position to understand the nuances of the evidence presented and the context in which the extraneous information was received, we give substantial deference to the trial court's assessment of the prejudicial effect, if any, of extraneous information received by a juror. See id.; United States v. Rogers, 121 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Cheyenne 855 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1988)).
(1) The View of the Intersection
The trial court concluded that the information obtained by the juror who went to the intersection at issue did not have much of an impact on the jury's deliberations and therefore that the State had rebutted the presumption of prejudice. We conclude that the State offered no persuasive evidence that the extraneous information did not prejudice the case.
The stipulation demonstrates that one of the jurors went out of her way to locate and drive through the intersection at issue and determine whether it was necessary to make a "wide turn" from Congress Street onto Stevens Avenue. She then shared her Conclusion--that a wide turn was not necessary--with the rest of the jury. Her Conclusion confirmed the State's position that Coburn's operation of her car was unusual and therefore that she was impaired by alcohol.
This is not a case where jurors used their own knowledge about local geography or their common sense regarding driving patterns. Nor was this information obtained coincidentally during the course of the trial. Rather, a juror who was not familiar with the intersection went out of her way to see it on her own after hearing the State's evidence regarding the intersection. A reasonable inference can be drawn from this act that the State did not provide sufficient evidence regarding the intersection to allow the juror to draw Conclusions without an independent investigation. Moreover, the jury's request for a read-back of the officer's "wide turn" testimony demonstrates that it played a role in the jury's determination.
In its effort to rebut the presumption, the State presented no persuasive argument that Coburn was not prejudiced by the juror's investigation except to rely on our decisi
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