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Whitworth v. Director of Revenue3/16/1999
.W.2d at 310 (quoting Chinnery v. Director of Revenue, 885 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Mo. App. 1994)).
Whether probable cause existed for the arresting officers to stop the vehicle is a different issue from the probable cause the statute enunciates for determining a violation of the drunk driving laws. Section 302.505.1 addresses the basis for the arrest for violating the drunk driving laws, and not the stop. As the Missouri Supreme Court stated in Riche v. Director of Revenue, No. 80861, slip op. at 7 (Mo. banc February 23, 1999), "neither section 302.505.1 nor the constitutional provisions [prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures, U.S. Const. Amends. IV and XIV, Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 15] require that the arresting officer's initial stop be based upon probable cause." The Missouri Supreme Court concluded in Riche that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in driver's license revocation cases. Id. The Court stated, " either the fourth amendment nor the Missouri Constitution requires that the exclusionary rule be applied to proceedings under section 302.505." Id. at 8. The result is that the probable cause standard is applied to circumstances occurring after the stop, and not before, when determining the validity of the arrest in driver's license revocation cases under section 302.505.1. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the trial court having erroneously applied the law to the stop of Mr. Whitworth the early morning of January 14, 1998. The decision of the administrative hearing officer affirming the Director's suspension of James Whitworth's driving privileges to operate a motor vehicle as authorized by section 302.505 is affirmed.
Separate Opinion: None
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