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Williams v. State1/21/1999
Mont. at 495-96, 938 P.2d at 696; Blomeyer v. State (1994), 264 Mont. 414, 871 P.2d 1338.
. Williams recognizes that the type of confusion discussed in Gentry and Blomeyer does not exist in this case. The videotape demonstrates that Williams was not advised of her Miranda rights until after she refused to take the BAC test. The confusion which Williams is arguing she suffered is confusion as to whether she was truly required to take a second breath test when the deputy asked her to do so. She has not provided this Court with a citation to any decision from Montana or any other jurisdiction which discusses the type of confusion she is asserting here. Without further support, we decline to adopt and extend the confusion doctrine in the manner which Williams requests.
. Williams also argues to this Court that due process requires that an explanation be given to a driver stopped on suspicion of DUI that one provision of Montana law requires the driver to submit to a PAST and another, separate, provision requires the driver to submit to a BAC test. As the State points out, this due process argument was not raised below.
. Rule 2(a), M.R.App.P., provides that " pon appeal from a judgment in a civil case, the court may review the verdict or decision, and any intermediate order or decision excepted or objected to within the meaning of Rule 46 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure." Theories of law not presented at trial will not be heard on appeal. Kapner, Wolfberg & Assoc. v. Blue Cross (1995), 270 Mont. 283, 286, 891 P.2d 530, 532. Because Williams failed to challenge the revocation of her driver's license on due process grounds in the District Court, we decline to consider that argument on appeal.
. The District Court's findings address the applicable issues from subsections (i) through (iv) of § 61-8-403(4)(a), MCA. The court's findings establish that the deputy had reasonable grounds to believe that Williams was driving upon a public way while under the influence of alcohol or drugs when he arrested her for DUI. The court's findings further establish that Williams refused to submit to the BAC test designated by the deputy at the Eureka police station. The findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise clearly erroneous.
. The District Court concluded that Williams failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her refusal to submit to a test of her blood alcohol concentration was legally justified. After reviewing the record, we hold that the District Court's Conclusion was correct.
. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
J. A. TURNAGE
We concur: JAMES C. NELSON WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR. JIM REGNIER W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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