 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. House2/24/1999
ude a particular race from the petit jury. The Court succinctly described the test in Purkett v. Elem:
"Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination."
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam). This test can be modified to examine, in a contested change of venue, the intentions behind the State's or the trial court's choice of a particular locale. Cf. Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 679 N.E.2d 139, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 698 N.E.2d 1191, and then aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. 1998) (using Batson test to evaluate whether change of venue from community with 25% African-American population to community with only 1% "was the equivalent of a wholesale peremptory challenge of African-Americans").
{91} The application of a modified Batson test is further justified by the fact that, unlike a mandatory change of venue under Section 38-3-3, a change of venue in the trial court's discretion effectively requires the trial court to engage in a Batson-like inquiry. In other words, a trial court's findings of fact that a fair trial cannot be obtained in the current venue and that an alternate venue is free from exception necessarily determines that a change of venue is justified by race- neutral reasons, thereby satisfying step two of the Batson test. Cf. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1991) ("While the reason offered by the prosecutor for a peremptory strike need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, [Batson, 476 U.S. at 97], the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will demonstrate its race- neutral character.").
{92} Though there was no express use of such a test by the trial court, the issue of intentional discrimination was raised below and the record contains ample evidence applicable to each step in the test. In the first step, House, as opponent of the venue change, needed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State's motion to select a particular venue, in this case Doña Ana County. The opponent will rely on the facts concerning the selection of the specific venue in establishing a prima facie case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95. House presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination with his cultural arguments and his evidence that, after he twice had a hung jury in a community that had a significant Native American population, the State advocated the move to a venue with few Native Americans. The first part of the test is satisfied by circumstantial evidence that the prosecution proposed a venue solely on the basis of race.
{93} In the second step, the State, as proponent of that venue, must present a race-neutral explanation. Throughout this case the State was accused of racism and, in arguing in favor of the move to Doña Ana, presented several race-neutral explanations. The State's explanations included the fact that, in contrast to Taos County, Doña Ana County had not been subjected to the frequent, pervasive, contemporaneous, and highly prejudicial publicity regarding the case. Moreover, Doña Ana had a much larger population than the small close-knit community of Taos and would be less likely to be tainted by the prejudicial publicity. The State's justifications are "`plausible'" though there is no requirement that they be even "minimally persuasive." See Purkett, 514 U.S. at
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 New Mexico DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|