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State v. Wolford2/18/1999
by the appellant, that his false statements were not made under oath and, thereby, not a "breach of the laws of this state," see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a)(1996 Supp.), we recognize that no court system can function without safeguards against actions that interfere with its administration of Justice. As such, it would be illogical to assume that a probationer is required, as a condition of probation, to make "full and truthful reports" to his/her probation officers, but be permitted to make deliberate and inaccurate representations to the court. We can reach no legitimate Conclusion other than finding that a probationer has an obligation to be candid with the court as an implied condition of probation.
Indeed, the purpose of probation is to give a defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision. A trial court, in its discretion, may revoke a probationer from this release status if the probationer demonstrates that he is no longer entitled to such a release status. As understood by the courts of this state and as directed by our sentencing provisions, a probationer is not entitled to remain on release status if he has shown that he cannot comply with the laws of this state, that he has violated a condition of his probation, or that he has not demonstrated behavior indicating good citizenship. This suggests that a probationer may be revoked if his conduct demonstrates that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose. See State v. Lee, 773 P.2d 655, 657 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). Certainly, a probationer's dishonesty with the trial court is an important measure in determining whether a probationary status is effective on this particular probationer. While the appellant's dishonesty with the trial court is not a specifically enumerated ground for revocation, it remains an action contrary to societal notions of honesty and uprightness and reflects an unwillingness to admit one's wrongs. Cf. State v. Dowdy, 894 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (lack of candor sufficient ground to deny probation).
In the opinion of this court, the trial court expressed sound and just reasoning in concluding that further probation in the present case was inappropriate. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the appellant's probated sentence. Finding no error in the court's decision, we affirm the order revoking probation.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court revoking the appellant's probation is affirmed. Additionally, we note that the trial court's suspension of the appellant's driver's license for a period of one year is in error. Tennessee law provides that " he court shall prohibit a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of time not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years)." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213 (c). Thus, this case is remanded to the trial court for modification of its order to reflect that the appellant's driver's license shall be suspended for a period of four years. See Cheairs v. State, No. 02C01-9304-CC-0070 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 26, 1994) ("Tennessee law gives the courts authority to correct an illegal sentence at any time, even if it has otherwise become final.") ( citing State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.1978)).
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR: JERRY L. SMITH, Judge JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
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