 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Strickland1/15/1999
. § 40-35-113(2).
C.
Appellant further contends that his "medical emergency" constituted a substantial reason excusing or justifying his behavior under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(3). However, as we have previously stated, Appellant had other, legal options for receiving his medication before his circumstances became critical. This mitigating factor is not applicable.
D.
Appellant asserts that by driving his car to get his required medication, he was motivated by a desire to provide necessities for himself, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(7). However, this factor "is more properly addressed to individuals who, because of their destitution, may choose to steal bread or milk for their children or themselves due to their dire circumstances." State v. Martie Lane Williamson, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9210-CR-00371, 1993 WL 335433 at *2, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed September 1, 1993, at Knoxville). Thus, this factor is inapplicable.
E.
Finally, Appellant insists that because he is in constant pain due to his health problems and he drove his vehicle to get medications to alleviate his pain, the trial court should have found that he acted under duress at the time the offenses were committed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(12). Duress has been defined by courts of this state as a "threat of `such a character as to overcome the mind and will and destroy the free agency of a person of ordinary firmness.'" State v. Jerry Taylor, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9612-CC-00499, 1998 WL 424570 at *11, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed July 29, 1998, at Nashville) (quoting Johnson v. Roland, 61 Tenn. (2 Baxt.) 203, 206 (1872)). Once again, Appellant had other legal means for obtaining his medication prior to the onset of the pain for which he is complaining. Although this Court sympathizes with Appellant's medical difficulties, we do not find Appellant's pain to be within the meaning of "duress" as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(12). This factor is inapplicable.
F.
Finally, this Court notes that Appellant has an extensive history of criminal convictions. Appellant, in his brief, acknowledges that he has over 48 misdemeanor convictions and arrests in Tennessee. In addition, Appellant has enough felony convictions to qualify as a Range II offender. Moreover, the present offenses were committed while Appellant was on bail for another felony offense for which he was ultimately convicted. Appellant insists that his sentences should be reduced due to his special circumstances, i.e., his need to receive the required medication as a result of his numerous illnesses. However, even if this Court were to find Appellant's proposed mitigating factors to be applicable, those factors would be greatly outweighed by the applicable enhancement factors.
Furthermore, Appellant's prior criminal record indicates that he has a sustained intent to violate the law. As such, his criminal record negates Appellant's assertion that he violated the law only as a matter of medical emergency.
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court imposed an appropriate sentence of three (3) years and six (6) months for each offense of violating the HMVO Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR: DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
Page 1 2 3 Tennessee DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|