 |
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Schreiber2/4/2004 Eubanks. Petitioner contends that Brown thus overrules Eubanks on this point, sub silentio.
The Supreme Court based its interpretation and conclusion in Brown on the plain language of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i). It also resolved the conflict certified to it between the first district in the Brown case and decisions of this court in Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) and the third district in Heller v. State, 601 So.2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the latter two cases which had announced a blanket rule *567 that a motion for exceptional circumstance extension can only be granted if filed during the 175-day speedy trial period. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown expressly disapproved of Vallieres to the extent that it conflicted with its interpretation that the extension could be granted as long as the speedy trial time and recapture period had not expired.
It is true that this case does not invoke the exceptional circumstances portion of rule 3.191. However, Brown also interpreted section 3.191(i), which does apply here. It expressly interpreted this section of the rule to authorize a State motion for extension of speedy trial time, as long as it is made during speedy trial time including the 10-day recapture period.
The circuit court ruled in the instant case that Brown was "confined to the narrow issue of whether an exceptional circumstances exception made during the 5/10 day recapture window was valid...." Petitioner argues that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in so limiting its construction of Brown, and we agree. There would be no rationale for imposing one interpretation of the time permitted for a request for extension if made on one ground (the need for a State appeal) and yet another, broader interpretation of the time permitted for a request for extension if based on the exceptional circumstances exception.
Petitioner notes that court rules such as this one are subject to the same rules of construction as are statutes. Castillo v. Vlaminck de Castillo, 771 So.2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing Syndicate Props., Inc. v. Hotel Floridian Co., 94 Fla. 899, 114 So. 441 (1927)). To adopt the inconsistent constructions of the rule as urged by respondent, and applied by the circuit court, would violate the basic dictates of these rules of construction in that it would lead to an absurd result. See generally Baldwin v. State, 857 So.2d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Therefore, we grant this petition for writ of certiorari, quash the circuit court's order granting prohibition, and remand this case to the county court for further proceedings.
Page 1 2 3 Florida DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|