State v. Landgraf1/11/1996
to return guilty verdicts on more than one of these alternatives and then imposed consecutive sentences for multiple violations of the same statute. On the present facts, we agree.
{31} Initially, we note the jury was instructed that to find Defendant guilty of vehicular homicide it had to find that Defendant's driving while intoxicated caused each death. The jury was also instructed that to find Defendant guilty of causing death while resisting, evading or obstructing an officer it had to find Defendant's actions in willfully refusing to bring his vehicle to a stop when signaled to do so by an officer caused each death. Because the jury found Defendant guilty of both types of homicide by vehicle on each death, and both statutory provisions require proof of causation, we must first consider that element. An act must be the proximate cause of a death before a conviction for homicide can be returned based on that act. See State v. Nichols, 34 N.M. 639, 642, 288 P. 407, 408 (1930). However, "in the determination of proximate cause common sense is not to be eliminated." State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 A. 609, 615 (Del. 1936); cf. ("Enactments of the legislature are to be interpreted to accord with common sense and reason."). Therefore, although a defendant may take several actions, each of which could have caused the victim's death, only one such action actually caused the death and the defendant can be convicted of only one murder. See People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 447 N.E.2d 193, 204, 68 Ill. Dec. 935 (Ill. 1983). This is one of the logical underpinnings for the "one death, one homicide conviction" rule adopted by several jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 246 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Manning, 234 N.J. Super. 147, 560 A.2d 693, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 117 N.J. 657, 569 A.2d 1351 (1989). In remanding convictions for both reckless homicide and causing death while operating a vehicle under the influence based on the same accident, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered the limitations of the causation element:
It matters no more that Carter was both intoxicated and driving recklessly in causing his passenger's death than it would have had Carter poisoned him, stabbed him and thrown him from a high bridge. The means of committing an offense may not be utilized to multiply the number of offenses committed. Only one homicide was committed and only one sentence may be imposed.
Carter v. State, 424 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
{32} Even if Defendant could cause death in two different ways by one act, however, we must also consider the other elements of Section 66-8-101. Section 66-8-101 sets out four ways in which homicide by vehicle may be committed. ), cert. granted, N.M. 904 P.2d 1061 (1995); . When a statute provides alternate means of committing an offense, each alternative should be treated as if it were a separate statute. See ), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553 (1992). However, "where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715, 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980); see also, Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (Fla. 1985) ("Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that the legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two different statutes."). In similar situations, other courts have held that, although the elements of two statutes punishing two types of homicide by vehicle do not strictly overlap, "the two offenses are su
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