State v. Landgraf1/11/1996
fficiently closely related so as to preclude punishment on both." Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 416 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Mass. 1981); cf. Carter, 424 N.E.2d at 1054 (where elements of two offenses partially overlap, court may convict on both but sentence on only one) (Staton, J., Concurring).
{33} Courts which have considered whether multiple statutory violations culminating in one death by vehicle can be subjected to multiple punishments have employed different methods of analysis and reached different results. Some have concluded that in such a situation, multiple punishments would violate the constitutional limitation on subjecting a defendant to double jeopardy. See, e.g., State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 136 (Me.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 857, 112 L. Ed. 2d 122, 111 S. Ct. 156 (1990). Other courts have relied upon a modern version of the Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932), analysis and have concluded that double jeopardy either does or does not apply depending on the theory of the offense pleaded by the state. Compare Dawson v. State, 612 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that double jeopardy does not apply to causing death while intoxicated and causing death recklessly when the theory of causing death recklessly does not implicate intoxication) with Carter, 424 N.E.2d at 1049-50 (Staton, J., Concurring) (concluding that double jeopardy does apply in a similar situation where the theory of causing death recklessly does implicate causing death while intoxicated).
{34} The purpose of the Blockburger analysis, however, is to use differences in statutory definitions as an indication of legislative intent. . If the elements do not coincide under Blockburger, we may then consider other indicia of legislative intent. ; . Even though all of the elements of Section 66-8-101 do not necessarily coincide, then, we think the statutory language and structure lead to the Conclusion that the New Mexico legislature did not intend multiple punishments for one death.
{35} We do not believe the New Mexico legislature intended one physical action by a defendant to serve as the predicate for more than one of the four alternatives presented under the homicide by vehicle statute. See ) (statutory enumeration of alternative methods of committing criminal sexual contact does not evince a legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments for the same act); see also ) (different subsections of forgery statute held alternative ways of committing the same offense), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 145, 848 P.2d 531 (1993).
{36} Since legislatures often produce little evidence of their intent regarding multiple punishment, the rule of lenity is often an appropriate tool of statutory construction in such contexts. See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381, 100 S. Ct. 1747 (1980); People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 435 N.E.2d 477, 479, 61 Ill. Dec. 780 (Ill. 1982). In this statutory framework the rule "merely means that if [the legislature] does not fix the punishment for a [state) offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses." Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84, 99 L. Ed. 905, 75 S. Ct. 620 (1955). "With regard to the constitutional prohibition on punishing a defendant in excess of legislative command, it is a principle of double jeopardy and requires that vague or ambiguous statutes be resolved leniently to prevent zealous prosecutors and timorous Judges from perceiving two offenses where the legislature intended only one." Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward A General Theory Of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 118 (1978). New
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