 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Baker3/27/1996
d. The evidence suggests Baker did not contribute to the delay. Moreover, the evidence supports a conclusion that the State caused the delay and could easily have prevented it. We conclude an analysis of the second factor of the Barker test favors Baker.
The third factor Barker announced concerns whether a defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial timely. Baker asserted his right in December 1994, the same month he first discovered the pending warrant for his arrest. He could not be expected to demand a speedy trial before he knew of the charges against him in Collin County. See State v. Empak, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 618, 624 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). We conclude the third Barker factor favors Baker.
Finally, we consider the factor of the prejudice to Baker from the delay. We assess prejudice in light of the interests that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect: 1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) minimizing the accused's anxiety and concern; and 3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Harris, 827 S.W.2d at 957. The most serious of these interests is the third because the inability adequately to prepare the defendant's case skews the fairness of the entire judicial system. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. There is prejudice if defense witnesses cannot accurately remember events because of delay. Id. Further, such loss of memory is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. Id.
Baker testified he had been upset and embarrassed since discovering the pending warrant because information about the warrant was open to the public. More significantly, Baker testified he could no longer remember relevant details about the evening of his arrest, such as where he had been, how much he had eaten, and the identity of people who could testify on his behalf about how much he had drunk. The State implied through its cross-examination that there were no witnesses who could testify on Baker's behalf. As the Barker court noted, it is difficult to show what has been forgotten. Furthermore, it was within the trial court's purview to judge Baker's credibility about his testimony of prejudice due to lack of memory. We conclude this final factor of our analysis also favors Baker.
Balancing the four factors of the Barker test, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying those factors and dismissing the information for want of a speedy trial.We overrule the State's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
JOSEPH B. MORRIS, JUSTICE
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 90
950815F.U05
|