Alexander v. State3/5/1996
ence. Green v. State, 880 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no pet.). The determination of the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Green, 880 S.W.2d at 202.
The State argues that Alexander has waived this point because it does not comport with his objection at trial. Grounds of error urged on appeal must comport with objections made at trial, or error is not preserved. Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 909, 130 L.Ed.2d 791 (1995); Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1115, 130 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1995); Tasby v. State, 679 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no pet.).
At trial, Alexander objected to this line of questioning on the bases that it was irrelevant and prejudicial. On appeal, however, he argues that this is improper impeachment because the "trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence of bias against the dangers of unfair prejudice, embarrassment or harassment of the witness and confusions of the issues." See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 401, 403. An objection that the evidence is not relevant is not synonymous with an objection that the evidence fails the probative/prejudicial balancing test. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (opinion on reh'g). Thus, the State argues that this point of error has not been adequately preserved for appellate review.
Assuming arguendo that this point has been preserved, this point of error still fails. The fact that Sanders was called by the State does not prevent the State's impeachment of Sanders to show her possible bias. A party may impeach his own witness without first showing surprise or injury. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 607. One way for a party to impeach a witness is to examine him or her concerning bias, interest, prejudice, or any other matter which might affect the witness's credibility. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 612(b); Perkins v. State, 887 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, pet. ref'd). Any motive that operates on the mind of a witness during testimony is material to the trial because of its effect on the witness's credibility. Perkins, 887 S.W.2d at 226, citing Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
In the present case, the trial court determined that the evidence of Sanders's failure to appear to testify in an earlier proceeding despite reasonable efforts by the State was proper. Because this is within the trial court's discretion, this point of error is overruled.
In his next point of error, Alexander contends that the trial court erred in overruling Alexander's objections to the punishment argument by the State which referred to community expectations of a life sentence.
Proper jury argument includes:
summation of the evidence;
reasonable deduction from the evidence;
answer to argument of opposing counsel; and plea for law enforcement.
Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 296-97 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Dunbar v. State, 551 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Remarks of counsel during final argument must be considered in the context in which they appear. Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Denison v. State, 651 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Counsel is allowed wide latitude in drawing inferences from the evidence, provided those inferences are reasonab
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