 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Wayt v. State3/11/1996
rd that the sentencing judge in this case presided at the earlier conviction of Wayt which was subsequently set aside by this court. Wayt acknowledged the district court's awareness that the earlier conviction had been overturned. Wayt is chargeable with the knowledge that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in cases closely related to the one before it. State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 172 n. 10 (Wyo. 1981). However, Wayt mounted no effort to disqualify the district judge, either peremptorily or for cause pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 21.1.
More to the point than identity of courts is the identity of sentences imposed for the overturned conviction and the present offense. Like the 1994 burglary, wrongful disposition of property was, in 1989, a felony punishable, inter alia, by a maximum of ten years imprisonment. Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (1988). It is fair to infer that, were the district court considering Wayt's earlier overturned conviction as an aggravating factor in the burglary sentence, the burglary sentence would have been noticeably more severe than the earlier sentence.
Not having attacked the overturned sentence, Wayt is ill-situated, six years and three DUI's later, to complain that the district court was unduly harsh in its later identical sentencing decision. Wayt, 809 P.2d at 803. This speaks not so much to waiver of the right to complain as it does to the inherent fairness of the later sentence.
Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that Wayt has, as the district court observed, been in trouble for twenty-five years, dating back to a 1970 delinquence adjudication. A defendant's juvenile record and his adult record, including dismissed charges, are important clues to his character and are worthy of consideration for sentencing purposes. Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117 (quoting United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S.Ct. 754, 74 L.Ed.2d 971 (1983)).
Under the circumstances, Wayt's three to five year sentence in this matter represents a model of judicial restraint.
B. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED
Wayt wants credit against his burglary sentence for the 169 days of incarceration in the Platte County jail. Indeed, presentence confinement predicated upon inability to post bond should be credited against the sentence imposed by the confining court. Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1990). Denial of credit for presentence confinement may constitute an illegal sentence. Eustice v. State, 871 P.2d 682, 684 (Wyo. 1994). However, presentence confinement credit does not include credit for confinement that would persist without regard to the defendant's bonding capacity in the court where he awaits sentencing. Wilson v. State, 896 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Wyo. 1995).
One hundred and fifty-three days in the Platte County jail occurred in spite of Wayt's capacity to post bond in Natrona County rather than as a result of any incapacity. Wayt's bondsman did step in after each of his arrests in Platte County to revoke bond, but Wayt's misadventures in Platte County were the reason for his jail time there. His Platte County time was independent of the burglary charge we consider here.
In fact, it appears that Wayt's sentencing in the district court manifestly benefitted him by foreshortening the time he would otherwise have had to spend in the Platte County jail.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wayt's sentence is well circumscribed by the limits imposed by statute and he has received appropriate, if not somewhat excessive, credit for time served against that sentence. The amended judgment and sentence of the district court is h
Page 1 2 3 4 Wyoming DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|