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State v. Nakata8/2/1994
zed previously in this opinion and in Wilson, the legislature clearly perceives the nature of the gravity and seriousness of first-offense DUI to be petty and repeat offenses to be serious. Furthermore, Act 128 supports the legislature's perception that first-offense DUI is petty by (1) amending first-offense DUI so as to provide a maximum prison term of only five days, (2) eliminating the possible penalty of court-ordered installation of an ignition interlock device in a first-time DUI offender's vehicle, and (3) leaving untouched additional statutory penalties that do not approach the seriousness of imprisonment.
In support of their position that a first-offense DUI is constitutionally serious, appellants cite Dow v. Circuit Court, 995 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 127 L. Ed. 2d 372, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1051 (1994), an opinion arising out of Hawaii, which holds that a person convicted of DUI and sentenced to mandatory attendance at an alcohol rehabilitation program was "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus review of the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1966). Nevertheless, whether a conviction is subject to review on habeas corpus grounds is not a factor in determining the constitutional seriousness of an offense. Moreover, whether a person is "in custody" is irrelevant to determining the right to a jury trial. Indeed, "the kind of custody that will suffice [for habeas corpus purposes] is Judged by a very liberal standard, and any restraint on a petitioner's liberty because of conviction that is over and above what the state imposes on the public generally will suffice." 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4262, at 305 (1988) (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 9 L. Ed. 2d 285, 83 S. Ct. 373 (1963) (a prisoner free on parole is in custody and may seek habeas corpus relief)) (emphasis added). Thus, appellants' reliance on Dow is misplaced.
Appellants also argue that the social stigma attached to a DUI conviction and its collateral consequences, such as dramatic increases in car insurance premiums and mandated compliance with HRS § 287-20 (proof of financial responsibility) in order to drive, make the offense constitutionally serious. But, consistent with our earlier analysis of the federal constitution, increased insurance rates by private insurers are not considered penalties because neither chapter 287 nor any other statutory scheme mandates that insurance companies increase rates for drivers convicted of DUI. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 n.8.
Appellants also cite federal and state cases from other jurisdictions holding that there is a right to a jury trial for DUI charges. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices (DWI Jury Trials), 135 N.H. 538, 608 A.2d 202 (1992) (six-month prison term for second DUI offense without right to jury trial violates New Hampshire constitution); United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981) (DUI on Yosemite National Park with maximum penalty of six months imprisonment and $500 fine is a serious offense providing a right to a jury trial); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335 (D. Md. 1978) (DUI on a national park with maximum six months imprisonment and $500 fine is a serious offense); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970) (holding that a jury trial is provided for any criminal offense, regardless of potential prison sentence, under the Alaska Constitution). These cases review constitutional requirements, legislative histories, and penalties different than Hawaii's DUI statute. Furthermore, the cited federal cases are pre-Blanton, and therefore, have been implicitly overruled.
Appellants also claim that the legislature's stated in
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