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State v. Nakata8/2/1994
detrimental effects of community outrage are tempered by calm deliberation.
2 Proceedings at 679-80 (emphasis added). Delegate DiBianco echoed the rationale:
Some states have had occasion in very recent years . . . to change the number [of jurors]. . . . I don't want to see us run the risk of having that kind of thing happen in Hawaii. . . . Certainly, at least for serious cases, we should go with the 12-[person] jury and we should have the protection in the Constitution. . . . When you're concerned with a serious felony, I think every defendant should feel safe in the knowledge that his Constitution mandates that he will have a 12-[person] jury, and neither our legislature, our Judges, nor anybody else can tamper with it.
Id. at 682. There was no mention of the serious/petty distinction that would determine the right to a jury trial. On the contrary, jury trials for a class of "non-serious" crimes were contemplated, but only in the context of fewer members on the jury. As Delegate Penebacker explained:
The absolute right to a 12-person jury is unnecessary in some situations because the potential penalty may be severe or create a great likelihood that Justice may be miscarried. It is important to allow for economic and efficiency considerations in these situations since they might not affect a fair or impartial trial. Thus a smaller jury of lesser members might be more just.
Id. at 680 (emphasis added). In further support of our Conclusion that "serious," as used in HRS § 806-60 and in article I, § 14, does not refer to the serious/petty distinction at issue in the instant case, we note that the language of article I, § 14 essentially tracks the language of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution but that article I, § 14 additionally provides that "juries, where the crime charged is serious, shall consist of twelve persons." (Emphasis added.) Despite the absence of any reference to "serious" crimes under the sixth amendment, the serious/petty distinction, in the context of the right to jury trial, exists because of the practice at common law.
So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions. There is no substantial evidence that the Framers intended to depart from this established common-law practice, and the possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications.
Duncan v. Lou isiana, 391 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
In sum, applying the three-part test from Wilson, we now hold that a charge of first-offense DUI under HRS § 291-4, as amended by Act 128, is constitutionally petty. The distinction between first and repeat offenders in Act 128's legislative history is critical, and the maximum mix of statutory penalties does not compel a different result. Being a constitutionally petty offense, no right to a jury trial attaches to first-offense DUI. Therefore, we now specifically limit O'Brien to its facts and Jordan to repeat DUI offenses; to the extent the holding of Jordan grants the right to a jury trial for first-offense DUI, we specifically overrule it. Given the current legislative view of the seriousness of repeat offenses and the mix of potential penalties, however, repeat offenses remain constitutionally serious. Accordingly, we answer the first reserved question in t
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