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State v. Nakata8/2/1994
ity in the criminal context by holding that all newly declared . . . rules must be applied retroactively to all criminal cases pending on direct review." Harper, U.S. at , 113 S. Ct. at 2516 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 545-48, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1981) and Powell v. Nevada, 128 L. Ed. 2d 1, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1280 (1994).
We acknowledge that this recent United States Supreme Court case law, by overruling the doctrinal foundation of Hawaii case law, could call into question our continued adherence to Ikezawa. However, relying on independent state law grounds, we choose to continue to follow the more flexible test we reiterated in Ikezawa when determining whether to retroactively apply decisions of state law made by this court.
In Ikezawa, we held that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by his reliance on previous precedent because the success of defendant's motion to dismiss turned on whether the Balauro case would be given retroactive effect. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. at 222, 857 P.2d at 599. Thus, the retroactivity question was outcome-determinative. Here, appellants have failed to show how they would be substantially prejudiced by the retroactive application of Act 128. The appellants would receive an impartial trial, albeit a non-jury trial, and would face lesser penalties under the new version of HRS § 291-4. As the Supreme Court stated in Duncan:
We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial -- or any particular trial -- held before a Judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a Judge as he would be by a jury. Thus we hold no constitutional doubts about the practices, common in both federal and state courts, of . . . prosecuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial.
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added). Unlike Ikezawa, retroactive application of Act 128 would not be outcome-determinative.
Therefore, we hold that retroactive application of today's decision to pending cases passes the test enunciated in Ikezawa. Accordingly, we answer the second reserved question in the affirmative.
C. Equal Protection and Separation of Powers
The trial court made a finding that some DUI defendants, charged after appellants were charged, have already had jury trials. Thus, appellants claim they have been treated differently than similarly situated individuals in violation of their equal protection rights under both the United States and Hawaii constitutions.
When a denial of equal protection of the laws is alleged, the initial inquiry is whether the legislation is subjected to a "strict scrutiny" or a "rational basis" test. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 571, 852 P.2d 44, 63, reconsideration and clarification granted in part, 74 Haw. 645, 852 P.2d 74 (1993). If either a suspect class or fundamental right is involved, the court applies a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. Otherwise, the rational basis standard traditionally applies, that is, whether the statute has a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 572, 852 P.2d at 64.
Act 128 does not divest the appellants of a constitutional right to trial by jury because that right never applied to "petty offenses." In enacting the statute, the legislature merely clarified its original view that first-time DUI offenses are constitutionally petty. Therefore, no fundamental constitutional right being implicated, the court applies a rational basis standard of
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