State v. Nakata8/2/1994
ximum of 180 days for first and repeat offenders) and State v. Jordan, 72 Haw. 597, 825 P.2d 1065 (1992) (right to jury trial for a first- and second-offense DUI having a maximum sentence of thirty and sixty days, respectively).
The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]" This fundamental right applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 88 S. Ct. 1444, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1412, 88 S. Ct. 2270 (1968). However, the right is not absolute; "petty offenses" are not subject to the sixth amendment guaranty of a jury trial. Id. at 159. Thus, based on the reserved questions, the inquiry narrows to whether first-offense DUI under HRS § 291-4, as amended by Act 128, is a constitutionally petty offense for purposes of the sixth amendment.
In Blanton, the Supreme Court stated the test as follows:
In determining whether a particular offense should be categorized as "petty," our early decisions focused on the nature of the offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law. In recent years, however, we have sought more "objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense." "We have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty. "
489 U.S. at 541 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court explained that:
In using the word "penalty," we do not refer solely to the maximum prison term authorized for a particular offense. A legislature's view of the seriousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it attaches to the offense. . . . Primary emphasis, however, must be placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration.
Id. at 542 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court in Blanton held that a charge under Nevada's DUI statute, which had a maximum authorized prison term of six months as well as other possible penalties (including wearing distinctive clothing identifying the offender as a convicted drunk driver), was not "constitutionally serious." Thus, the sixth amendment granted no right to a jury trial for a charge under the Nevada DUI statute Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545.
In United States v. Nachtigal, 122 L. Ed. 2d 374, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 1072, 1073 (1993), the Court reiterated that "offenses for which the maximum period of incarceration is six months or less are presumptively 'petty'." Id. (citing Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543). "A defendant can overcome this presumption, and become entitled to a jury trial, only by showing that the additional mix of penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a 'serious' one." Id. In Nachtigal, the defendant was charged under a federal DUI regulation with operating a motor vehicle in Yosemite National Park while under the influence of alcohol. The Court held that the charge, with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment, a maximum $5,000 fine, a maximum five year term of probation, and a host of additional penalties, was not constitutionally serious.
Here, the maximum authorized term of imprisonment for a first-offense DUI under HRS § 291-4, as amended, is five days -- well below the six-month threshold enunciated in Blanton. A first-offense DUI is, therefore, presumptively "petty" for purposes of federal constitutional analysis.
The additional possible mix of penalties for a firs
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