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State v. Nakata8/2/1994
a maximum prison term of sixty and 180 days for a second- and third-offense DUI, respectively, the legislature arguably rejected this court's suggestion of prison terms that would have included such repeat offenses in the petty category.
In Jordan, we applied the three-part O'Brien test to the 1990 amended version of HRS § 291-4 (the version immediately prior to Act 128). In assessing the gravity of both a first- and second-offense DUI, we interpreted the legislative history of the 1990 amendment, which "indicated [that] the legislature continued to regard DUI as a very serious crime and social problem" despite reductions in the maximum prison sentence to thirty days for a first offense and to sixty days for second offense. Jordan, 72 Haw. at 601, 825 P.2d at 1068. We also noted that the legislature had added the ignition interlock penalty provision for a first-time offense. Id. at 599, 825 P.2d at 1067. Therefore, in Jordan, we continued to interpret all levels of offenses under HRS § 291-4 as constitutionally serious. Jordan effectively turned, in part, on our interpretation of the legislature's perception of a first-time DUI offense.
Following Act 128's enactment in 1993, we decided Wilson. As noted previously, in Wilson, we reviewed a charge related to DUI, that is, driving after license suspended for DUI under HRS § 291-4.5. We based our analysis of the section 291-4.5 charge, in part, on Act 128. We reasoned as follows:
After reviewing our opinion in Jordan, the legislature, in 1993, decisively spoke and deemed our view of its perception of the seriousness of first time DUI offenses to be in error.
Irrefutably, the legislature regards first time DUI offenses as constitutionally "petty" offenses, thereby characterizing the potential mix of penalties faced by a first time DUI offender constitutionally "petty" as well. Moreover, it is now clear that the legislature has always viewed first time DUI offenses as petty.
Wilson, 75 Haw. at 77-78, 856 P.2d at 1245 (emphasis added). We relied on the legislature's specific and unambiguous declaration that:
the purpose of [Act 128] is to reduce the penalties for first time offenders so that there can be no question that, as to first time offenders, the offense is a "petty offense" in the constitutional sense, to which no right to jury trial attaches. The legislature finds that those offenders who are convicted repeatedly of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor represent a serious social problem. . . . First time offenders, however, represent less of a threat to society, as most will respond to corrective action.
Act 128, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws at 179 (emphasis added). This unequivocal legislative statement provides a strong indication of society's view of the gravity of first offense DUI.
Consequently, we held in Wilson that a charge under HRS § 291-4.5 is not constitutionally serious and did not entail the right to a jury trial because "if the legislature had always intended the potential mix of penalties faced by a first time DUI offender to be constitutionally 'petty,' then by promulgating similar penalties for a violation of HRS § 291-4.5, it also intended HRS § 291-4.5 to be constitutionally 'petty'." Id. at 78, 856 P.2d at 1246.
In Wilson, we relied on the legislature's perception of the gravity of the offense as well as the potential mix of penalties and indicated in dictum that a first-o
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