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State v. Nakata8/2/1994
the enactment of laws. Ultimately, however, our judgment must be independent.
With these principles in mind, we examine and clarify Wilson and its interpretation of O'Brien and Jordan. Initially, we note that the legislative history prior to Act 128 did not specifically distinguish between the "seriousness" of first and repeat DUI offenses. On the contrary, the legislative history prior to Act 128 implicitly perceived first and repeat DUI offenses to be substantially equal in seriousness.
As previously noted, in O'Brien, this court relied heavily on the legislature's perception of the gravity of the general nature of DUI as evidenced by its pronouncements culminating in the Conclusion that DUI "is one of the State's most serious and tragic problems." O'Brien, 68 Haw. at 43, 704 P.2d at 886. Additionally, we believed that by providing a maximum imprisonment term of 180 days for first and repeat offenses, the legislature intended no distinction between such offenses in terms of their seriousness. Therefore, although in Wilson we interpreted the history of Act 128 in 1993 as indicating that the legislature "always viewed first time DUI offenses as petty," we are not compelled to overrule O'Brien. Merely because a legislature by hindsight indicates that an offense should be viewed as petty does not make it so. In short, we must apply all three factors of the O'Brien/Wilson test in determining whether an offense is petty or serious.
In Jordan, this court dealt with a reserved question presenting the issue of jury trial for both first- and second-time DUI offenders and held that such offenders have a right to a jury trial. Upon applying the O'Brien test in Jordan, we stated:
In light of O'Brien, we are unwilling to draw such a distinction where the only downgrading of the seriousness of the crime in the statute is a "clarification" by which the maximum jail sentences for first and second offenders is 30 and 60 days, respectively, instead of six months, but where an additional penalty has been added, and where the legislative history of Act 188 of the 1990 Session Laws, as well as Act 1 of the 1991 Special Session, all indicate the legislature continues to regard as a very serious crime and social problem.
Jordan, 72 Haw. at 601, 825 P.2d at 1068.
The legislative history of Act 128 indicates that the legislature was specifically responding to Jordan's interpretation of the legislature's view of the gravity of a first-offense DUI and explained its perception that "first time offenders . . . represent less of a threat to society, as most will respond to corrective action." Act 128, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws at 179. Thus, we acknowledged in Wilson this court's erroneous interpretation, in Jordan, of the legislative perception regarding first time DUI offenders, thereby implicitly overruling Jordan. To the extent that the court in Jordan interpreted first-offense DUI to be constitutionally serious, we explicitly overrule it today.
Despite our reasoning in Wilson, appellants argue that first-offense DUI remains constitutionally serious. They contend that a reduction from a thirty- to five-day maximum jail sentence is insignificant, and that the additional maximum "mix of penalties" has not otherwise changed from that in Jordan and O'Brien (other than eliminating the unimplemented ignition interlock provision). Essentially, they argue that the reasoning in Jordan and O'Brien compels the finding that DUI per se is serious. They assert that the current mix of penalties indicates that the people of Hawaii view DUI as a grave and serious offense. However, as analy
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