State v. Cleveland2/26/2003
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, JJ., and Circuit Judge Amano, assigned by reason of vacancy, and Acoba, J., concurring separately)
The defendant-appellant Sean K. Cleveland appeals from the judgment of the district court of the second circuit court, Wailuku Division, the Honorable Douglas H. Ige presiding, convicting him of the offenses of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-4 (Supp. 2000), inattention to driving, in violation of HRS § 291-12 (Supp. 2002), and failure to drive on right side of roadway, in violation of HRS § 291C-41 (1993). Cleveland argues that the district court, the Honorable Jan K. Apo presiding, erred in denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to Maui Police Department (MPD) Officer Mark Vickers on the date of the alleged offenses, on the basis that Officer Vickers subjected him to "custodial interrogation" without first providing him with Miranda warnings.
Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction.
It is settled in Hawaii that "the requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by ' wo criteria': '(1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody.'" State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawaii 207, 210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000) (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawaii 195, 204, 948 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1997) (quoting State v. Blanding, 69 Haw. 583, 586, 752 P.2d 99, 100 (1988))). Inasmuch as Officer Vickers subjected Cleveland to "express questioning," Cleveland was "interrogated." See id. (citing State v. Melamai, 64 Haw. 479, 481 n.3, 643 P.2d 541, 544 n.3 (1982)).
"To determine whether 'interrogation' is 'custodial,' we look to the totality of the circumstances, focusing on 'the place and time of the interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of the questions asked, the conduct of the police, and other relevant circumstances.'" Ah Loo, 94 Hawaii at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 (quoting Melemai, 64 Haw. at 481, 643 P.2d at 544) (brackets in original). Again, the question to be answered, once it is determined that a defendant has been "interrogated" within the meaning of article I, section 10, is whether the defendant, at the time of the "interrogation," was "in[ ] custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom . . . in any significant way[.]" . . . [State v. ]Hoey, 77 Hawaii [17,] 33, 881 P.2d [504,] 520 [(1994)] (citations omitted). State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawaii 107, 122, 34 P.3d 1006, 1021 (2001) (footnote omitted).
As we recently noted in Ah Loo, "no precise line can be drawn" delineating when "custodial interrogation," as opposed to non-custodial "on-the-scene" questioning (which is outside the protection against self-incrimination that article I, section 10 affords to an accused), has occurred. 94 Hawaii at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 (citations, internal quotation signals, and original brackets omitted). Rather, the question whether a person has been significantly deprived of his or her freedom, such that he or she is "in custody" at the time he or she is "interrogated," must be addressed on a case-by-case basis "because each case must necessarily turn upon its own facts and circumstances." [State v. ]Patterson, 59 Haw. [357,] 362, 581 P.2d [752,] 756 [(1978)]. . . . .
. . . Ah Loo reiterates the basic principle that when an officer lawfully conducting an investigative detention lacks probable cause to arrest the detainee and -- so long as his or her questions remain brief and casu
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