Hedlund v. Steven D. Sheldon-Superior Court10/8/1992
FELDMAN, Chief Justice
We accepted jurisdiction over this special action to determine whether the trial Judge abused his discretion when he decided to employ "dual juries" in a criminal trial. See Rule 3, Ariz.R.P.Spec.Act., 17B A.R.S. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and Rule 8(b), Ariz.R.P.Spec.Act.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 1991, Michael Hedlund and James Erin McKinney (Defendants) were indicted as codefendants on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of burglary, and one count of theft. The Maricopa County Attorney subsequently filed a notice that he would seek the death penalty against each Defendant if convicted.
Before trial, the trial Judge severed the cases because the prosecution intended to offer in evidence inculpatory statements made by each codefendant that would be inadmissible against the other. See United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1968). However, because virtually all of the other evidence appeared to be admissible against both Defendants, the trial Judge ordered that dual juries would be impaneled to hear the case. Under the Judge's order, two juries would be selected from separate panels, each to hear the case against one of the Defendants. For all but the reading of charges, opening statements, closing arguments, and approximately one afternoon's testimony, both juries would be present in the courtroom; however, only the jury hearing a particular Defendant's case would be in the courtroom to hear the charges against that Defendant, his opening statement, closing argument, and testimony related to his inculpatory statements. Minute Entry, March 18, 1992, at 6-8.
Defendants challenged the Judge's order by bringing a special action in the court of appeals, which accepted jurisdiction. With one Judge Dissenting, the court granted Defendants relief, ruling that the trial Judge erred in ordering that dual juries be impaneled. Hedlund v. Superior Court, 171 Ariz. 566, 832 P.2d 219, 220-21 (Ct. App. 1992). The decision was based on our holding in State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1984). Hedlund, 171 Ariz. 566, 568, 832 P.2d 219, 221. The Dissenting Judge concluded that the trial Judge had properly "used his discretion -- particularly those underused elements, flexibility, adaptability, and innovation. Although the Lambright case presents a barrier, I do not think it as solid a barrier as the majority finds it to be." Id. at 566, 832 P.2d at 221 (Fidel, J., Dissenting).
The state petitioned this court to review the court of appeals' opinion. Treating the petition for review as a petition for special action, we accepted jurisdiction. We entered an order vacating the court of appeals' opinion and affirming the trial Judge's order to impanel dual juries, with our opinion to follow. This is that opinion.
Discussion
The issue in this case requires us to reevaluate our holding in Lambright, and we believe a preliminary explanation of why we have chosen to revisit Lambright is warranted. In matters relating to the interpretation and application of court rules and procedures, this court must pay constant attention to developments in court procedures and changing circumstances in order to fulfill our constitutional role. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5. In furtherance of this responsibility, we will reevaluate prior decisions regarding court procedures, where principles of stare d
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