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Polson v. State12/11/1992
Per Curiam:
On July 11, 1990, appellant Kyle Dean Polson was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A Douglas County sheriff observed Polson pull his pickup into a parking lot, get out of the vehicle, fall down, get up, and start urinating in a place in public view. Polson was unresponsive to a request to produce his driver's license, had slurred speech, bloodshot and watery eyes, and was having trouble maintaining his balance. Upon arrest Polson promptly passed out in the back seat of the patrol car, and was unable to be awakened. A blood sample was drawn registering a blood alcohol level of .332.
Polson pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of NRS 484.379. At sentencing, the district court admitted evidence of two prior convictions of violations of NRS 484.379, and sentenced Polson to one year in prison, the minimum sentence allowable for a third DUI conviction under NRS 484.3792.
[108 Nev. 1044, Page 1046]
Appellant contends that his second prior conviction was inadmissible because a citation that was filed in lieu of a formal complaint was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the municipal court that entered the second prior conviction.
A citation may serve as a complaint in DUI cases if the form of citation includes “information whose truthfulness is attested as required for a complaint.” NRS 484.817. The attestation of truthfulness required of a complaint is an oath before a magistrate or notary public, or a declaration subject to the penalty of perjury. NRS 171.102. The citation in question contained language above the arresting officer's signature stating that he was signing under penalty of perjury.
Appellant contends, however, that the language was irrelevant because an officer is not required to make such an affirmation under NRS 484.799(1), which only requires that a citation be signed, not that it be attested. Appellant argues that because the oath on the citation is not required by NRS 484.799(1), a conviction for perjury regarding the arresting officer's statements on the citation could not stand. See White v. State, 102 Nev. 153, 717 P.2d 45 (1986); Licata v. State, 99 Nev. 331, 661 P.2d 1306 (1983). Thus, appellant concludes that the citation does not contain an attestation of truthfulness as required for a complaint because the citation is not really written under penalty of perjury, and, therefore, the municipal court never acquired valid jurisdiction.
[108 Nev. 1044, Page 1047]
When a statute is capable of being understood in two or more senses by reasonably informed persons, the statute is ambiguous, and the plain meaning rule has no application. McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 649, 730 P.2d 438, 442 (1986).
NRS 484.799 is ambiguous. It allows a peace officer in misdemeanor traffic cases to prepare a written traffic citation “in the form of a complaint.” The form of a complaint as defined in NRS 171.102 is “a written statement of the essential facts . . . made upon . . . eclaration which is made subject to the penalty for perjury.” However, NRS 484.799 merely states that “ he citation must be signed by the peace officer.” It does not expressly require the citation to be signed under penalty of perjury. The statute is capable of being understood by reasonably informed persons either to require a declaration under penalty of perjury, or not to require a declaration under penalty of perjury.
An ambiguous statute can be construed in line with what reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended. McKay, 102 Nev. at 649, 730 P.2d at 442. The legislature's intent in enacting
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