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Goettl v. State11/30/1992
e, the illegal stop tainted the consent to search.
In Cunningham v. State, 591 So.2d 1058, 1061 (Fla.App. 1991) (emphasis in original), Florida drew a line distinguishing between the degree of corroboration required for a stop and that required for a search or arrest:
It is not sufficient merely to corroborate the anonymous information concerning the identity, dress, description, location or even future activity of the suspect who is the subject of the anonymous information. In addition to independent evidence verifying that type of information, there must also be independent evidence of criminal activity on the part of the suspect. Otherwise, any totally innocent person could be the object of an anonymous tip furnishing verifiable information about name, description, whereabouts and future activity. When that type of verifiable information is furnished together with unverifiable allegations of criminal activity, a detention and search of a person so anonymously informed against is not authorized.
The court said it acted from a "growing concern" that even after the anonymous caller's information is sufficiently corroborated to justify a stop, the search or arrest is not authorized absent "the discovery of evidence sufficient to establish in the mind of the detaining officer probable cause to believe that the detainee is engaged in criminal activity * * *." Id. at 1060. See also Sapp v. State, 592 So.2d 786 (Fla.App. 1992) (holding officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop when an anonymous caller gave only details of identification and location and officers made no independent observations supporting probable cause to believe any criminal activity was taking place) and Swanson v. State, 591 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Fla.App. 1992) (holding police corroborated only "easily obtained facts and conditions presumably existing at the time * * *" of the anonymous informant's call).
The concern of state courts that innocent conduct not be used to justify an investigatory stop is highlighted by a recent New Hampshire Supreme Court decision. In State v. Kennison, 134 N.H. 243, 590 A.2d 1099, 1100 (1991), an anonymous caller told police that Gina Kennison had four pounds of marijuana in the trunk of her car. The caller said Kennison drove a blue Cadillac and gave her license number. According to the caller, Kennison would leave her work place in Nashua, New Hampshire at 3:00 p.m. to travel to Hudson, New Hampshire where, after going to her home, she would be making marijuana deliveries. Police confirmed that the Cadillac was parked at Kennison's work place in Nashua and that a woman departed in the car at 3:00 p.m. Another officer, who knew Kennison, witnessed her arrive home, park her car and enter her house. Id. After about two hours, she left her home in the Cadillac. The officer followed for less than a mile before he "pulled her over." Id. No suspicious or illegal activity had been observed.
Deciding the case under provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution, the court held the police "lacked reasonable suspicion" and "unjustifiably intruded upon Kennison's protected privacy interests." Id. 590 A.2d at 1102. First, with no "track record" of previously accurate information to point to, the anonymous informant lacked reliability. Id. at 1101. Second, minimal information existed showing the informant's basis of knowledge. Third, the information about the car, license number, place of employment and departure time was readily available. The "predictions" that Kennison would leave Nashua, drive to Hudson and then leave home again did not show a special familiarity with Kennison's affairs. Fourth, the police corroborated "mundane, innocen
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