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City of Tucson v. Fahringer7/21/1988
influence of intoxicants and/or that the accident was not attributable to the driver's fault. The statute does not create insurmountable hurdles for the class of plaintiffs to which it applies. We find no violation of article 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
Although the trial court based its determination solely on the abrogation clause discussed above, Westley and Goodwin also argued that A.R.S. § 12-820.03(2) violates the equal protection clause of our constitution, which provides:
No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or a corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13. The test applied to this statutory challenge is the "rational basis" test under which a statutory classification will be found to violate equal protection guarantees only if the classification is based on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives. Bryant v. Continental Conveyor and Equipment Co., 156 Ariz. at 196, 751 P.2d at 512. As long as the statute is not arbitrary or irrational, and is reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose, it will be upheld.
In searching the history of this statute, we find no specific legislative consideration of relevancy to state objectives. See Minutes of Meeting, House Committee on Government Operations, March 28, 1984; Minutes of Meeting, Senate Judiciary Committee,
February 13, 1984. The Governor's Commission on Government Tort Liability had proposed a governmental tort claims act which eliminated all liability on the part of the government where an accident was caused by the fault of a drunk driver even where the public entity was also at fault in contributing to the accident. Majority Report, supra at 14. The defense proposed by the commission provided that a public entity would not be liable "for any damages . . . hich are attributable to the fault of a person driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Majority Report, supra at 22-23.
The legislature avoided the harsher result of the defense as proposed by providing that the defense applies only to the drunk driver and his or her adult passengers. From this, we infer two legitimate state objectives both related to the legislature's recognition of the injuries which result on our roads and highways at the hands of drivers who drive while intoxicated. Cf. Hinson v. Coulter, 150 Ariz. 306, 723 P.2d 655 (1986). First, the defense clearly is intended to discourage drivers from operating a vehicle while intoxicated. In view of the fact that the defense applies to adult passengers, we also infer an intent to encourage riders to ascertain the sobriety of their drivers and to discourage drunks from driving by putting passengers on notice that they accept rides with drunk drivers at their peril. In differentiating between adult and minor passengers, the legislature must have presumed some awareness on the part of the adult of a driver's state of intoxication. Second, the legislature intended that public monies not be expended to compensate for injuries resulting to adult passengers at the hands of their drunk drivers.
We cannot say that § 12-820.03(2) is irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives. The classification created by A.R.S. § 12-820.03(2), that drunk drivers and their non-m
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