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THORNELL v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY12/20/1996
mended to reflect the amendments to § 32-5A-191, enacted after the adoption of ordinance no. 125-79. After a review of the record, we conclude that the uniform traffic ticket and complaint, the charging instrument, specifically charged the appellant with violating one of those sections of § 32-5A-191 that was adopted after the effective date of ordinance no. 125-79.
The appellant argues that because the Montgomery ordinance has not been amended to include any of the amendments to § 32-5A-191 enacted after its effective date, the conviction should be reversed. He further contends that when he entered his guilty plea he should have been sentenced pursuant to section 4 of ordinance no. 125-79. Section 1-8 of the Montgomery Municipal Code clearly indicates that " ny person or corporation committing an offense within the corporate limits of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, or within the police jurisdiction thereof, which is declared by a law or laws of the State of Alabama now existing or hereafter enacted to be a violation, shall be guilty of an offense against the City." (Emphasis added).
The language of section 1-8 clearly indicates that any amendments to the state statutes referenced therein are to be encompassed in the ordinance; therefore, the appellant's sentence, imposed pursuant to § 32-5A-191, was appropriate. This section allows the municipality to charge persons who have committed a misdemeanor, as that term is defined by state law, without having to formally adopt that state law as an ordinance of the city.
"As the Supreme Court of Alabama has repeatedly stated, 'the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.' Pace [v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 578 So.2d 281 (Ala. 1991)] at 283 (citing Clark v. Houston County Commission, 507 So.2d 902 (Ala. 1987); Advertiser Co. v. Hobbie, 474 So.2d 93 (Ala. 1985); League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 290 So.2d 167 (Ala. 1974))."
Daugherty v. Town of Silverhill, 672 So.2d 813, 816 (Ala. Cr. App. 1995). For this Court to hold that ordinance no. 125-79 was enacted to misconstrue legislative intent would be absurd.
"It is well settled that 'words used in statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says.' Tuscaloosa County Commission v. Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Tuscaloosa County, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala. 1991). Furthermore, if the language is clear and unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction."
Ex parte Cobb [Ms. 1941500, August 2, 1996] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala. 1996). Clearly, the intent of ordinance no. 125-79 was to encompass existing law in Alabama and any future laws that may be enacted.
The appellant was correctly sentenced in this case, and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County had jurisdiction to impose
sentence on the appellant pursuant to his plea of guilty to driving under the influence .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in this case is due to be, and is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Judges concur.
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