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GWARJANSKI v. STATE12/20/1996
ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
The opinion of October 11, 1996, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor.
Paul Jeffrey Gwarjanski was convicted in Montgomery District Court for driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of ยง 32-5A-191(a), Ala. Code 1975. He appealed to Montgomery Circuit Court, and a jury found him guilty of driving under the influence. He was sentenced to 60 days in the county jail. The sentence was suspended, and he was placed on unsupervised probation for one year.
I.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and his motion in limine as to evidence seized as a result of a stop of his vehicle. He argues that the state failed to demonstrate probable cause for the state trooper's stop of the appellant's vehicle and that, therefore, the evidence seized as a result of the search of his vehicle was inadmissable. We disagree.
Only "reasonable suspicion," not probable cause, is required to support the traffic stop in this case. This court stated in Watts v. State, 651 So.2d 1105 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), that "a police officer has the authority to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 1107. Reasonable suspicion for a particular stop is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, as known to the officer at the time of the stop. State v. Washington, 623 So.2d 392, 395 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993).
Here, the state trooper testified that he observed the appellant for approximately 40 minutes before he stopped the appellant's vehicle. During that time, the state trooper saw the appellant, who was driving in heavy traffic, change lanes without signaling properly, drive too close to cars ahead of him, abruptly brake several times, swerve back and forth between lanes, and veer a couple of feet over the white line on the edge of the road. (R. 128-29.) Based upon these observations, the state trooper, at the first opportunity, stopped the appellant's vehicle. When the state trooper approached the appellant, he smelled alcoholic beverages and he noted that the appellant's eyes were glazed, watery, and bloodshot. (R. 133-34.) The state trooper testified that the appellant was arrested after he failed a field sobriety test. Considering the appellant's reckless driving, the state trooper had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to support this particular traffic stop.
II.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the results of the Intoxilyzer 5000 ("I-5000") blood-alcohol test indicating that his blood-alcohol concentration was .191%. He argues that the state failed to meet the criteria set out in Ex parte Mayo, 652 So.2d 201 (Ala. 1994). In Mayo, the Alabama Supreme Court held that I-5000 test results are admissible if the prosecution "show that the test was administered by a qualified officer in the usual manner and that the I-5000 in question passed inspection before and after the test." 652 So.2d at 211. Here, the state established through the testimony of state trooper W.A. Neal, who administered the I-5000 test, that Trooper Neal was qualified to administer the blood-alcohol test and that he administered the test to the appellant in the usual manner. The appellant specifically argues, however, that the state did not properly prove that the I-5000 passed inspection before and after the test was administered.
The state offered into evidence a certified copy of the logbook for the I-5000 machine used to test the appellant. This logbook is used to record the
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