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State v. Anaya12/6/1996
ogous to that of Arizona, see Campa, 814 P.2d at 751, and Iowa, see Bown, 475 N.W.2d at 6. Although "a general rule does not really emerge from these cases because of the differences in the individual state statutes interpreted," Bown, 475 N.W.2d at 6, I am persuaded that more recent decisions are moving away from the older general rule reflected in Lawson and Chapman. Id. I think it is more likely than not that the Legislature adopted recent changes in New Mexico's DWI law based on the law of other states. I find support for this result in cases construing similar schemes in other states.
E. Rule of Lenity
{69} Defendants also rely on the cases from other jurisdictions, cited above for the proposition that, in interpreting criminal statutes, the rule of lenity should preclude application of both enhancements. The majority opinion argues that the rule of lenity applies. I respectfully disagree.
{70} We have stated that the rule of lenity only applies in situations where overwhelming ambiguity persists or evidence of conflict creates a doubt as to legislative intent after considering the policies, language, structure, and history of the legislation. See , cert. denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 294, 115 S. Ct. 336 (1994). In such a scenario, the rule operates to prevent enforcement of the harsher result. See . While sound policy underlies the rule of lenity, we may not read ambiguity into the statutes for the sole purpose of applying the rule. "The rule is not applicable simply because it is possible to construe a criminal statute more narrowly than urged by the State." . In these cases, the two statutes at issue do not conflict, but operate together harmoniously. Thus the rule of lenity on which Defendants have relied ought not be applied. See generally id. ; (discussing the rule of lenity). The Legislature's designation of felony status to DWI offenders implicates the habitual offender statute to effectuate a policy of punishing as repeat felons incorrigible drunk drivers with prior felony convictions. Application of the rule of lenity defeats the legislature's apparent intent.
F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
{71} Defendants finally argue that enhancement under both the DWI statute and the habitual offender statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VII; N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. Defendants appeal from the following sentences: Anaya 9 1/2 years (1 1/2 years of which was suspended); Gonzales 9 1/2 years; Martinez 5 1/2 years (1 1/2 years of which was suspended); and Nakai 2 1/2 years.
{72} Defendants recognize that the imposition of penalties is a legislative function that will normally receive deference from the courts. However, relying on ), they argue that a sentence of 9 1/2 years for an offense that would be a misdemeanor but for its repetition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Arrington court recognized that in "exceedingly rare cases" a term of imprisonment may be inherently cruel. Id. at 561, 855 P.2d at 135. Accordingly, the Arrington court affirmed the trial court's determination that a mandatory prison term that would deprive a severe asthma sufferer of special medical needs would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 562, 855 P.2d at 136. These cases do not present the sort of "exceedingly rare" circumstances that were present in Arrington. Furthermore, this Court has been very reluctant to second-guess the Legislature's judgment concerning the appropriate punishment for a particular crime. See (affirming a sentence of life imprisonment, under the former habitual offender statute, upon a conviction for burglary); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 111 S. Ct. 2
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