CITY OF DODGE CITY v. DOWNING4/21/1995
entered his ruling that the defendant was denied a speedy trial, and that the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol should be discharged.
"On May 23, 1994, the City of Dodge City filed its Motion for Reconsideration and District Judge Daniel L. Love convened a hearing on May 27, 1994, to hear arguments on the Motion for Reconsideration. After hearing oral arguments,
the Court found that its previous ruling that the defendant was denied a speedy trial be affirmed."
There is no dispute that the time taken to bring the defendant to trial was 204 days. The City argues that the district court erred by not charging the defendant with the time from the date of filing of his motion to suppress until the time set by the court for filing of briefs on the motion, a total of 16 days. The City also argues that the defendant should be charged with a reasonable period of time for the trial court to consider and resolve the motion to suppress. We agree and conclude that the 16 days, as well as 14 days for the court to resolve the defendant's motion, are attributable to the defendant. The deduction of 30 days occasioned by application of the defendant establishes that on May 25, 1994, the scheduled trial date, he would have been brought to trial in 174 days, well within the dictates of K.S.A. 22-3402(2).
K.S.A. 22-3402(2) states:
"If any person charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond shall not be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (3)." (Emphasis added.) While the State has an obligation to insure that an accused is provided a speedy trial, delays which "happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant" are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period under K.S.A. 22-3402(2). See State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994).
When a defendant, as in this case, files a motion to suppress evidence, any delay caused by the filing of the motion is necessarily the result of the application of the defendant. Under a plain reading of the statute, a reasonable time taken by the parties and the court to process the defendant's motion to suppress should be charged to the defendant. This is the rule in Kansas as well as in many other jurisdictions. See State v. Prewett, 246 Kan. 39, 785 P.2d 956 (1990); State v. Roman, 240 Kan. 611, 731 P.2d 1281 (1987). See also Saffold v. State, 521 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524, 525,
798 S.W.2d 94 (1990); People v. Cabrera, 188 Ill. App.3d 369, 371, 544 N.E.2d 439 (1990); State v. Blount, 519 So.2d 153, 154 (La. App. 1987); State v. Sorensen, 243 Mont. 321, 331, 792 P.2d 363 (1990); State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 439, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990).
In Roman, we found that the six months it took the district court judge to decide a motion to suppress were not chargeable to the defendant. 240 Kan. at 613. In doing so, we noted that procrastination, whether it is prosecutorial or judicial, is not the fault of the defendant and that any party filing a motion has a right to assume that it will be acted upon expeditiously. 240 Kan. at 613. We also noted, however, that " f the motion to suppress had been filed at the end of the 180-day statutory speedy trial period, a reasonable time (at most two or three weeks) for decision might well be charged to a defendant under appropriate c
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