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CITY OF DODGE CITY v. DOWNING4/21/1995
ircumstances." 240 Kan. at 613.
In State v. Prewett, 246 Kan. 39, 43, 785 P.2d 956 (1990), we stated: "Furthermore, in Roman, the 7-day period between the defendant's motion to suppress and the hearing on the motion was found properly chargeable to the defendant." Actually, we did not specifically make such a finding in Roman, but instead simply noted that neither party disputed that the seven days were chargeable to the defendant. 240 Kan. at 612. Nevertheless, because a motion to suppress is filed at the urging of the defendant, the time between the filing of the motion and the time set by the court for submission of briefs, provided this is not an unreasonable period of time, is properly chargeable to the defendant.
Not all of the time taken by the court to rule on the motion to suppress should be chargeable to the defendant. Instead, when the motion is taken under advisement for a long period of time, only a reasonable time, i.e., no longer than two to three weeks, should be properly chargeable to the defendant. See State v. Roman, 240 Kan. at 613. We conclude that here the two weeks during which the defendant's motion to suppress was taken under advisement should be chargeable to the defendant. Moreover, the 16 days granted the parties to file briefs on the defendant's motion
to suppress should also be charged to the defendant. Both periods of time are delays which happened as a result of the application of the defendant under K.S.A. 22-3402(2). A deduction of 30 days attributable to the defendant demonstrates that the defendant would have been brought to trial within the statutory period.
Reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint.
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