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STATE v. SAVARD6/6/1995
nch, 511 U.S. at ___ n. 21, 114 S.Ct. at 1947 n. 21, 128 L.Ed.2d at 780 n. 21. See also United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. at 1304. We recognize that under our statutes the revocation of a driver's license subsequent to an arrest for OUI is part of an overall scheme developed by our Legislature for dealing with the very serious problem of drinking and driving. We conclude, however, that the civil action taken to suspend each defendant's driver's license occurred in a "separate" proceeding for purposes of our analysis under double jeopardy.
II.
Next, we must consider whether the revocation or suspension of a driver's license constitutes punishment. In Halper, the Supreme Court announced what it envisioned as "a rule for the rare case." " nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal proceeding may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Recognizing the difficulty in conducting that inquiry, the Court indicated that a violation of double jeopardy "can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state." Id. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901.
he determination whether a given civil sanction
constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a
particularized assessment of [what] the penalty may fairly be
said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal
sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in
the individual case serves the goal of punishment.
Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-1902.
The penalty before us has taken the form of the suspension of a driver's license. There exists no absolute right to obtain and hold a driver's license. Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me. 1969). The driver's license is a privilege to which certain rights and responsibilities attach and for valid reasons involving public safety may be granted or withheld. State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me. 1975); Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649. It is a special privilege, however, which carries with it certain due process rights. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (" icenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment"). The defendants do not argue that their due process rights were violated.
When issued a license, the vehicle operator agrees to abide by certain conditions and rules of the road, see e.g., 29 M.R.S.A. § 1071-1072 (1978 & Pamph. 1994) (lights); §§ 1151-1152 (1978) (passing); and
§§ 1251-1255 (1978 & Pamphs. 1993 & 1994) (speed), and acknowledges that the continued use of the license to drive is dependent on compliance with the laws relating to vehicle operation. 29 M.R.S.A. § 631 (1978). A licensee has no absolute right of ownership in a motor vehicle operator's license. A licensee's right to use the license is specifically conditioned on observing specified operating standards. The suspension of that privilege merely signifies the failure of the holder to comply with the agreed conditions. See Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649; Johnson v. State of Maryland, 622 A.2d 199, 205 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1993) (" evocation of a voluntary privilege is `characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.'"). We analogize the driver's license to professional licensing and certification, which, if abused, may be revoked in th
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