STATE v. SAVARD
6/6/1995
e name of public safety. See e.g., Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Haw. 21, 889 P.2d 705 (Haw. 1995) (revocation of medical license following criminal conviction for sexual abuse was intended to protect the public from unfit physicians and, thus a legitimate nonpunitive government objective); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992) (imposition of an absolute trading ban on commodities trader charged with fraud and conspiracy was remedial); Schillerstrom v. Arizona, 180 Ariz. 468, 885 P.2d 156 (1994) (revocation of chiropractor's license was not barred by prior criminal conviction because purpose was to protect the public interest); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Comm'rs, 263 Ga. 63, 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993) (revocation of business license following nolo contendere plea to sex offense was not intended to serve as retribution thus not barred by double jeopardy). Revocation of the license is nonpunitive in character.
Looking to the specific stated purpose of the statute and the legislative history implementing the statutory authority of the Secretary of State to suspend a driver's license, our proposition that the revocation is remedial is confirmed. The language of the statute clearly states its purpose:
§ 1311-A. Suspension on administrative determination for
operating with an excessive
1. Purpose. The purpose of this section is:
A. To provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or
otherwise use the public highways of the State; and
B. To remove quickly from the public highways of this State
those persons who have shown themselves to be a safety hazard
by operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle with an
excessive
The Legislature intended the suspension to serve as a means to ensure public safety. The statement of fact accompanying the bill through the legislative process evidences this intent. See L.D. 1749, Statement of Fact (111th Legis. 1983) ("This will tend to avoid situations where persons charged with operating under the influence are not brought to trial quickly, due to backlog of court cases or delaying tactics used by the defendant.").
Given the explicit language provided by the Legislature, we conclude that any punitive or deterrent purpose served by the suspension of an operator's driver's license following an arrest for OUI is merely incidental to the overriding purpose intended by the Legislature to provide the public with safe roadways. Although we acknowledge that any suspension may have a deterrent effect on the law-abiding public, our analysis does not focus on that perspective. In the eyes of the defendant even remedial sanctions may carry a "sting of punishment." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 & n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 n. 7.
The entry is:
Judgments affirmed.
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