 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Rodarte v. State6/22/1995
we held that the purpose of the statute at issue, removing dangerous drivers from the road, would be thwarted by construing the twenty-day limit as mandatory. (citing and quoting Taylor v. Department of Transp. , 260 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1977)).
6. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written. See . In this case, it is clear and unambiguous that the words "if practical" modify the mandatory word "shall." See . The statute means what it says--that if it is practical, the Department shall schedule a hearing within thirty days of the notice of revocation. The provision for continuing a hearing has no meaning unless a hearing has already been set. In order for the Department to request a continuance of a hearing, a hearing must first be set. While the statute requires that hearing to be set within thirty days if practical, failure to do so is not fatal to the revocation proceeding.
7. Although neither Petitioner nor the Department point us to anything that would help us to determine whether our interpretation of Section 66-8-112(B) is consistent with the legislature's purpose, that inquiry is not necessary in this case. See ) (unnecessary to apply rules of statutory construction when intent of legislature is clear and apparent from language of statute).
8. Finally, Petitioner argues that his procedural due process rights were violated by the Department's failure to set the hearing within twenty days of the notice of revocation. While license revocation proceedings are subject to due process protections, we disagree with Petitioner's argument that his due process rights were violated in this case in which the revocation hearing was held a mere two and one-half months after notice of revocation. Cf. (nine months minimum length of time that may be considered presumptively prejudicial in a simple case with readily-available evidence). As in , Petitioner has established no prejudice to his case on the merits arising from the delay. The restriction on his travel opportunities and loss of a picture identification is not the type of prejudice the due process clause recognizes as sufficient to halt a prosecution on grounds of delay. Cf. ), cert. denied , 113 N.M. 524, 828 P.2d 957 (1992).
9. However, similar to our Discussion in Littlefield , we emphasize that the thirty-day provision in Section 66-8-112(B) is directory and not merely advisory. The Department should make every effort to schedule revocation hearings within thirty days of the notice of revocation.
10. Because we find that failure to schedule a revocation within thirty days of notice of revocation is not fatal to the revocation proceeding, we reverse the order of the district court and reinstate the Department's revocation of Petitioner's driving privileges.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
|